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QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which forbids age-based discrimination against state
and local government employees, preclude those
employees from bringing a section 1983 action to
redress age discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause?
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Petitioner Anthony Hildebrand respectfully prays
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals entered on June 27, 2014.

--------·-------OPINIONS BELOW
The June 27, 2014 opinion of the court of appeals,
which is reported at 757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014), is set
out at pp. la-32a of the Appendix. The January 4,
2013 opinion of the district court, which is not officially reported, is set out at pp. 33a-54a of the Appendix.
The December 7, 2012 opinion of the district court,
which is unofficially reported at 2012 WL 6093798
(Dec. 7, 2012), is set out at pp. 57a-80a of the Appendix.

--------·-------JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered
on June 27, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

--------·-------STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The statutory provisions and constitutional
provision involved are set out in the Appendix. App.
81a-123a.

--------·--------
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents the issue which the Court
granted certiorari to decide in Madigan v. Levin,
No. 12-872, cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2 (2013):
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
precludes section 1983 actions alleging age-based
discrimination that violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Anthony Hildebrand was employed as a detective
for the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office
("DA's Office") for five years before he was terminated
in early 2011. Prior to his work at the DA's Office,
Hildebrand spent fifteen years as an undercover
narcotics detective with the Pittsburgh Police Department.
Hildebrand alleges that for several years before
his dismissal he was subject to a campaign of harassment by officials in the DA's Office. Officials repeatedly described Hildebrand as an "old man" or "old
mother f**ker," commented on his "gray old man beard,"
"ugly old ass," and "senility," taunted him as having
Alzheimer's disease, and referred to Hildebrand and
others of the same age as "old sons of. bitches." One
official commented, "'[Y]ou old guys just don't understand English. Can't your old decrepit mind understand
plain English?"' One Assistant District Attorney
posted on a public bulletin board near Hildebrand's
work area a photograph "of a very old man with a
beard smoking crack cocaine," labeling the old man
with Hildebrand's name. Hildebrand was given far

3

more work than younger detectives, but at times was
relegated to demeaning tasks and a smaller work
area without a desk, phone or computer. He was
given a dangerously defective car, described by one
official as an "old car for an old man." Ultimately
Hildebrand was threatened with baseless criminal
charges. When Hildebrand did not resign, he was
dismissed. Complaint, pp. 4-21.
Hildebrand filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC and Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission. The charge asserted that because of his
age he had been "subjected ... to a hostile work environment" and discharged. Following receipt of a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Hildebrand commenced this action in federal district court, alleging
that he had been repeatedly harassed and finally
dismissed because of his age. The complaint asserted
a number of different legal claims, including an
allegation that this discrimination violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (" ADEA''), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and a contention that the discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint, p. 24. The complaint sough~ to enforce that constitutional claim
through the private cause of action provided by
section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim. 1 With regard to Hildebrand's
1

The district court initially dismissed the complaint in
December 2012. App. 57a-80a. Hildebrand filed an amended
(Continued on following page)
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ADEA claim, the court held that the complaint was
insufficient because, although it contained a general
allegation that Hildebrand had filed a timely charge
and brought suit within 90 days of the right-to-sue
letter, the complaint lacked a specific allegation as to
the dates of that charge and letter. App. 36a-44a, 61a62a (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
The district court dismissed the section 1983 claim on
the ground that the complaint lacked sufficiently
specific allegations of a custom or policy of unconstitutional action. App. 48a-53a, 67a-71a; see Monell u.
Dept. of Soc. Sues. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
On appeal, the Third Circuit reinstated the ADEA
claim against the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, although not against Allegheny County.
App. 25a-30a. With regard to Hildebrand's section
1983 action, the Third Circuit held that the ADEA
precludes any section 1983 action based on a claim
that age-based discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause, and on that ground affirmed the
dismissal of the section 1983 claim. App. 8a-22a. The
Third Circuit acknowledged that there is a. circuit
conflict on this issue, and expressly disagreed with
the contrary holding of the Seventh Circuit in Levin

complaint, which the court dismissed in January, 2013. App.
33a-54a.
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v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S.Ct. 1600 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 2
(2013).

-------·-------REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
In March 2013 this Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the ADEA precludes a section 1983
claim of unconstitutional age-based discrimination.
Madigan v. Levin, 133 S.Ct. 1600 (2013). There was
an insolvable vehicle problem in Madigan, and the
petition was dismissed as improvidently granted. 134
S.Ct. 2 (2013). This case presents the same question,
and provides an ideal vehicle for resolving it.

I.

THERE IS AN IMPORTANT CIRCUIT
CONFLICT REGARDING WHETHER THE
ADEA PRECLUDES A SECTION 1983 ACTION TO REDRESS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGE-BASED DISCRIMINATION

This Court granted certiorari in Madigan v.
Levin to resolve the circuit conflict regarding whether
the ADEA precludes a section 1983 claim of unconstitutional age-based discrimination. See Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Madigan v. Levin, 7-10, available
at 2013 WL 166411. The Third Circuit decision in this
case, expressly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit
decision in Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.
2012), further entrenching and compounding that
conflict.
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The Seventh Circuit in Levin concluded, contrary
to the decision of the Third Circuit in the instant
case, that the ADEA does not preclude section 1983
age-based equal protection claims. 692 F.3d at 611-22.
The Seventh Circuit insisted that the standard governing preclusion of a section 1983 constitutional
claim is more demanding than the standard governing cases in which a plaintiff seeks to use the section
1983 private cause of action to enforce a statutory
right. 692 F.3d at 611-15. The ADEA did not preclude
section 1983 equal protection claims, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned, because the ADEA was not enacted
for the purpose of enforcing constitutional rights.
In [Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 75 (1972)
and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)],
the statutes at issue were specifically designed to address constitutional issues .... The
ADEA is readily distinguishable. "In contrast
to the statutes at issue in Preiser and in
Smith, the ADEA does not purport to provide
a remedy for violation of constitutional
rights. Instead it provides a mechanism to
enforce only the substantive rights created
by the ADEA itself." Zombro [v. Baltimore
City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364,] 1371 [(4th
Cir. 1989)] (Murnaghan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
692 F.3d at 618-19. In addition, the Seventh Circuit
held that preclusion was inappropriate because the
rights and protections afforded by the ADEA are
different from those that would exist in a section 1983
equal protection case. "[T]he right and protections

7

afforded by the ADEA and § 1983 equal protection
claims diverge in a few significant ways." 692 F.3d at
621. Moreover, it explained, the ADEA did not authorize civil actions against certain categories of defendants who could be sued in a section 1983 case. Id.
The Third Circuit in this case expressly disagreed with the reasoning and conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in Levin. The court below rejected the
Seventh Circuit's view that the ADEA could not
preclude section 1983 equal protection claims unless
Congress adopted the ADEA for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right against age discrimination. The Third Circuit thought it sufficient that the
ADEA forbids at least some discriminatory practices
that would also violate the Equal Protection Clause,
even if Congress did not adopt the ADEA for that
purpose. App. 21a. The Third Circuit rejected the
Seventh Circuit's objection that the ADEA provides
no protection at all for a significant numbers of
excluded individuals and types of age discrimination
claims, and contains no remedies at all for other
types of age-discrimination equal protection violations. According to the Third Circuit, the denial of
any relief for those categories of potential constitutional violations confirmed - rather than undermined
-its conclusion that the ADEA precludes all section
1983 equal protection claims. App. 22a. In addition,
the court of appeals below explained that it "cannot
agree with Levin that Congress must provide some
'additional indication' of its intent" beyond creating
an administrative and judicial enforcement scheme
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for the statutory rights that are created by the ADEA.
App. 19a (quoting Levin, 692 F.3d at 619).
The Seventh Circuit decision in Levin was itself
avowedly contrary to earlier decisions in several
other circuits. 692 F.3d at 616. In Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989),
the Fourth Circuit applied a general rule that statutory schemes are presumed to preempt section 1983
actions, unless there is a clear showing that Congress
intended to preserve such ·section 1983 actions,
applying the same rule regardless of whether the
section 1983 action in question was to enforce that
statute or to enforce the constitution.
[T]he general policy of precluding § 1983
suits, where Congress has enacted a comprehensive statute specifically designed to redress grievances alleged by the plaintiff, is
as applicable in instances such as the case at
bar as cases where a constitutional claim is
attached to a statutory claim brought under
§ 1983. We hold that this policy should be followed unless the legislative history of the
comprehensive statutory scheme in question
manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently rights
under both the comprehensive statutory
scheme and other applicable state and federal statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We find
no such intent in the language and history of
theADEA.
868 F.2d at 1368-69. In Lafleur v. Texas Dep't of
Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth

9
Circuit reasoned that the fact that the ADEA "covered" age discrimination was sufficient to preclude
any section 1983 age-based equal protection claim.
[W]here Congress has enacted a statute that
covers a specific substantive area providing
specific remedies, a cause of action under
§ 1983 is foreclosed.... [B]ecause Congress
has enacted a statutory provision to confront
age discrimination in the work place via the
ADEA, ... Lefleur's § 1983 age discrimination
claim is preempted by the AD EA.
The Tenth Circuit subsequently adopted the holding
in Lafleur. Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140
(lOth Cir. 1998) ("For numerous, well-founded reasons ... the ... Fifth Circuit[] ha[s] concluded that age
discrimination claims brought under § 1983 are
preempted by the ADEA. See LaFleur .... We ... adopt
the holding and rationale of LaFleur ... as the law of
this circuit.. .. "). Later the Ninth Circuit also held that
the ADEA bars such section 1983 equal protection
claims. Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education, 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Congress
intended the ADEA to serve as the exclusive means
for pursuing claims of age discrimination in employment. Therefore, the preclusion of § 1983 claims in
this context is required."); see Cummins v. City of
Yuma, Arizona, 410 Fed.Appx. 72, 73 (9th Cir. 2011)
("the ADEA is plaintiff's exclusive remedy. As a
matter of law, plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 equal
protection claim for age discrimination in employment."). The First and Fourth Circuits have applied

10
this majority rule to constitutional claims by federal
employees. 2 Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745
(1st Cir. 2003); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.3d
315, 318 (D.C.Cir. 1991).
The existence of this circuit split is deeply entrenched and widely acknowledged. The court of
appeals below recognized this circuit conflict. "[A]
number of our sister Courts of Appeals have held that
the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims of age discrimination .... The Seventh Circuit ... , however, reached the
opposite conclusion." App. 15a; see id. at 16a ("the
Seventh Circuit diverged from this consensus view.").
"Contrary to Levin, ... we conclude that ... the relevant considerations weigh in favor of finding that the
ADEA does indeed bar such § 1983 claims." App. 18a.
The Third Circuit explained that it "cannot agree
with Levin" that the mere existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme in the ADEA is insufficient
without more to demonstrate that the ADEA precludes section 1983 actions. App. 19a. "Although, as
the Levin court emphasizes, the potential defendants
are different under the ADEA and § 1983, we do not
believe this distinction significant enough to demonstrate congressional intent to permit both claims."
App. 21a-22a.
2

An equal protection claim by federal employees would rest
on the private cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The cause of action provided by section 1983 is limited to
discrimination that occurs under color of state law, and thus
applies only to state and local government employees.
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In its brief in the court of appeals, Allegheny
County noted that the Seventh Circuit decision in
Levin was contrary to decisions in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Brief of Allegheny
County, 19 n.3, available at 2013 WL 2951781. Since
the Seventh Circuit decision in Levin, a number of
district courts have recognized the circuit split.
Edwards v. Borough of Dickson City, 994 F.Supp.2d
616, 622 (M.D.Pa. 2014) (contrasting the majority
view with "the minority position taken by the Seventh Circuit"); Collins v. Fulton County School Dist.,
2012 WL 7802745 at *24 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 26, 2013)
("the Seventh Circuit has split from the majority
rule .... "); McCampbell v. Bishop State Community
College, 2013 WL 5979752 at *3 (S.D.Ala. Nov. 12,
2013) (noting "the emergent circuit split").
The importance of this issue is attested to by the
amicus briefs that were filed at the certiorari stage in
Madigan. Twelve states submitted a brief urging the
Court to "intervene to end the conflict among the
circuits." Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and
Eleven Other States in Support of Petitioners, 3,
available at 2013 WL 648688. That brief correctly
noted that "whether a state or municipality may be
subjected to suit under both the ADEA and § 1983
depends entirely on its location." ld. at 4. The International Municipal Lawyers Association also filed a
brief urging this Court to grant review. Brief for
International Municipal Lawyers Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, available at 2013
WL648687.
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As the state petitioner in Madigan correctly
pointed out, "the question whether the ADEA precludes § 1983 employment discrimination claims
arises regularly, and the federal courts are intractably divided. Only this Court can impose national
uniformity on this recurring question." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, 10.

II.

THE DECISION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STANDARDS IN SMITH V. ROBINSON AND
FITZGERALD V. BARNSTABLE SCHOOL
COMMITTEE

Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), and
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246
(2009), establish the standards governing when a
statute precludes a section 1983 action to enforce a
related constitutional right. First, the statute must
have been enacted for the purpose of enforcing that
specific constitutional right. Second-, Congress must
have intended that the statute be the "sole" and
"exclusive" method of enforcing the constitutional
right in question. 3 Neither of those standards are
3

Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 24 7 (burden on the defendant is to
show that Congress__ saw Title IX, Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, as "the sole means of vindicating the
constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions"); Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009
(issue is whether "Congress intended that the [statute] be the
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert those
[constitutional] claims.").

13
satisfied in this case. The Third Circuit did not purport to hold that these standards had been met, but
instead mistakenly rested its decision largely on the
fact that the ADEA creates an administrative and
judicial remedy for enforcing the statutory rights
created by that law.
(1) The first element of the Smith/Fitzgerald
test is a demonstration that in enacting a given
statute, Congress intended the legislation, not merely
to enforce the rights established by the statute itself,
but also to provide a remedy for a constitutional
right. In Smith that showing was made in several
ways. The statute there at issue, the Education of the
Handicapped Act ("EHA"), itself expressly stated that
one purpose of the legislation was to protect the equal
protection rights of handicapped children. Section 3
of the EHA explained that the legislation was enacted
"to assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children in- order to assure equal protection of the
law."4 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6). The legislative history
of the EHA specifically emphasized the need to assure that handicapped children have the access to
an appropriate public education that several courts
had held was guaranteed by the Equal Protection

• In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), there was
similar textual evidence that Congress intended to provide a
remedy for constitutional violations when it adopted the habeas
corpus act. 411 U.S. at 483 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)).
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Clause. 468 U.S. at 1010. The Senate Report expressly detailed the intent of Congress to provide a
remedial mechanism to enforce the constitutional
rights of handicapped children. S.Rep. 94-168, p. 9
(1975). And the EHA applied to the very individualshandicapped children in public schools - whose constitutional rights were at stake. See Smith, 468 U.S.
at 1009 ("petitioner's constitutional claims ... are
virtually identical to their EHA claims.").
In Fitzgerald, on the other hand, there was no
showing that Congress had enacted the statute in
question- Title IX- to provide redress for any identified constitutional problem. The text of Title IX
contains no reference to equal protection or any other
constitutional right. Because there was a lack of
congruity between the schools and practices covered
by Title IX, and the schools and practices subject to
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court concluded it
was unlikely that Congress intended Title IX to be a
remedy - least of all an exclusive remedy --for equal
protection violations. "In cases in which the § 1983
claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a comparison
of the rights and protections of the statute and those
existing under the Constitution. Where the contours
of such rights and protections diverge in significant
ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights."
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-53. "A comparison of the
substantive rights and protections under Title IX and
under the Equal Protection Clause lends further

15
support to the conclusion that Congress did not
intend Title IX to preclude§ 1983 constitutional suits.
Title IX's protections are narrower in some respects
and broader in others. Because the protections guaranteed by the two sources of law diverge in this way,
we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that
'Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right.. .. '" 555 U.S. at 256. 5
The question in the instant case is whether the
ADEA forbade age-based discrimination against state
and local government employees for the purpose of
protecting the constitutional right of those workers to
be free from irrational age-based discrimination. 6
This Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), forecloses any possibility
of meeting this standard. "Judged against the backdrop of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence, it
is clear that the ADEA ... ' ... cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional

5

This Court made a similar point when explaining why
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., does
not preclude utilization of the pre-existing rights in section 1981
to remedy racial discrimination in employment. "Section 1981
_ is not coextensive in its coverage with Title VII. The latter is
made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)."
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460
(1975).
6
As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA did not apply to
government employees. It was amended in 1974 to cover those
workers.
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behavior.'" Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
at 83-84 (2000) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). The problems which the ADEA
addressed were usually not constitutional in nature.
"Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation.'' 528 U.S. at 89.
In addition, the prohibitions enacted by the
ADEA have little correlation with potential constitutional violations. On the one hand, most of the government employment practices forbidden by the
ADEA would not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
"The [ADEA] through its broad restriction on the use
of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices
than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.''
Kimel u. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 86. To the
extent that some employment decisions forbidden by
the ADEA also happen to violate the Equal Protection
Clause, that is an entirely incidental effect of legislation that was not adopted for the purpose of enforcing
constitutional rights. On the other hand, the ADEA
is limited in a manner which necessarily excludes
many government employees and possible constitutional violations claims.
The Third Circuit did not hold or suggest that the
ADEA, like the EHA, was enacted for the purpose of
enforcing constitutional rights. To the contrary, it
stated only that "[b]y prohibiting 'arbitrary age discrimination,' the ADEA encompasses the protections

17
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment .... " App. 21a.
That comment is only an observation that there is a
limited degree of overlap between the prohibitions of
the ADEA and the guarantees of the Equal Protection
Clause, not a claim that Congress applied the ADEA
to state and local government employees for the
purpose of enforcing that constitutional right.
(2) Second, there must be a showing that Congress intended that the statutory scheme in question
be the exclusive remedy for the constitutional right.
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252 ("exclusive avenue"), 256
("sole means"). Such a demonstration is necessary to
meet a defendant's burden of proving that the statutory scheme was intended to supplant, rather than
merely supplement, enforcement of that constitutional right under section 1983.
Congress often adopts a series of overlapping
statutes and remedial schemes to deal with a single
problem. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 48 (1974), the Court noted that "Title VII was
designed to supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination." Where Congress creates supplementary provisions to address a particular problem, those
provisions will ordinarily have different remedies or
procedural schemes. Such differences alone cannot
demonstrate that one provision was intended to preclude use of the other; Congress may simply have
intended to provide several tools for addressing a
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difficult problem. 7 Thus the mere fact that a statute
was adopted to provide a remedy for a constitutional
violation does not, without more, establish that the
law was intended to be the only such remedy, displacing section 1983 actions or any other pre-existing
right or remedy.

Smith concluded that this standard had been met
in that case because "[t]he legislative history [of the
EHA] ... indicates that Congress perceived the ERA
as the most effective vehicle for protecting the constitutional right of a handicapped child to a public
education." 468 U.S. at 1012-13 (emphasis added).
The comprehensive scheme established by the ERA
had been described in detail in Board of Education of
Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176 (1984). Under the EHA, an "individualized
educational program," containing a number of required features, must be developed to meet the needs
of each child, through a highly structured process
mandated by the statute. The Court in Smith concluded that the EHA precluded section 1983 actions
because Congress had determined that the elaborate
system of rights and procedures established by the
EHA was "the most effective means" for enforcing the
7

-

See Johnson u. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at
461 ("Congress has made available to the claimant ... independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a
valuable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative
route may be highly preferred over the litigatory; under others
the reverse may be true.").
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constitutional rights of handicapped children, specifically a more effective means of doing so than lawsuits
to enforce those constitutional rights. 468 U.S. at
1011-12. "No federal district court presented with a
constitutional claim to a public education can duplicate that process." I d. 8 It was on that basis that
Smith concluded that "Congress intended the EHA to
be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may
assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed
education .... " 468 U.S. at 1009 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, Fitzgerald explained that a
"lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a
comparison of the rights and protections of the statute and those existing under the Constitution. Where
the contours of such rights and protections diverge
in significant ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights." Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-53 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Fitzgerald
reasoned that Congress could not have intended that
Title IX be the exclusive remedy for gender-based
discrimination in education because Title IX itself did
not apply to all institutions subject to the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause or to all constitutional
claims that might arise at covered institutions. 555
U.S. at 257-58.
8

"The very importance which Congress has attached to
compliance with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP
would be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state
decisions at nought." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
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As the Seventh Circuit noted in Levin, the ADEA
like Title IX is expressly inapplicable to significant
categories of public employees and to certain identifiable types of unconstitutional discrimination. "[T]he
ADEA expressly limits or exempts claims by certain
individuals, including elected officials and certain
members of their staff, appointees, law enforcement
officers, and firefighters. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j),
630(f) .... The statutory scheme also prohibits claims
by employees under the age of forty or those bringing
so-called 'reverse age discrimination' claims. See Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581
(2004) .... There are no such limitations for § 1983
equal protection claims." Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d
at 621. 9 In addition, the ADEA provides no remedies
at all for certain types of age-based discrimination. Of
particular importance here, because the ADEA does
not authorize compensatory damages, there would
ordinarily be no statutory remedy for age-based
harassment, 10 one of the very claims in this case. The
ADEA cannot possibly be the "exclusive remedy" for
age-based discrimination against workers under 40,
for discrimination against workers because of their

9

E.g., McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F.Supp. 1114, 1117 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (statute law forbidding hiring of any person over the age
of 29 as a police officer "bears no rational relationship to any
legitimate state purpose and is violative of the equal protection
of the law.").
10
See Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2008).
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youth, or for age-based harassment, because it provides no remedy at all for such discrimination. 11
The Third Circuit "th[ought] that the fact that
certain government employees are either exempted
from the ADEA, or limited to certain remedies, ...
demonstrates congressional intent to specifically
define the rights of those employees rather than to
permit such employees to circumvent these limitations by filing directly under § 1983." App. 22a. On
this view, the intent of Congress in adopting the
ADEA was not to enforce the rights guaranteed by
the Equal Protection Clause, but instead to bar
enforcement of some of those rights by "defin[ing]"
them out of the ADEA. This is the very opposite of the
standard established by Fitzgerald and Smith. Under
those decisions, the exclusion from a statutory scheme
of an identifiable subset of constitutional rights
demonstrates that Congress did not intend the statute to be the exclusive method of enforcing that right,
not that Congress was attempting to "define" away
and obstruct enforcement of those rights.
(3) The linchpin of the Third Circuit's opm10n
wa_s its insistence that the existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme in ADEA is sufficient, without
11

This problem is highlighted by the comment in Ahlmeyer
v. Nevada System of Higher Education, that "[ w ]e are unable to
perceive ... a constitutional claim for age discrimination that is
not vindicated fully by the ADEA." 555 F.3d at 1058. In fact, as
the Seventh Circuit emphasized in Levin, there are many such
claims.
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more, to preclude any section 1983 age discrimination
claim. The court emphasized that the ADEA requires
an employee to file an administrative charge with the
EEOC prior to filing suit, and directs the EEOC to
seek to conciliate such discrimination charges. App.
20a. "In light of these requirements, we agree with
the majority of our sister Courts of Appeals that this
scheme would be undermined if plaintiffs could sue
directly under § 1983." App. 20a-21a.
If that aspect of the ADEA is sufficient to bar
section 1983 actions for age-based discrimination,
however, the similar remedial provisions of Title VII
would also bar section 1983 actions for race-based
discrimination. The ADEA remedial scheme is largely
modeled on the provisions of the earlier-enacted Title
VII charge process; significant portions of the language of the ADEA are taken essentially verbatim
from the provisions of Title VII. The direction in
sections 626(b) and 626(d)(1) of the ADEA that the
EEOC seek "to eliminate" any unlawful practice
"through informal methods of conciliation, conference,
and persuasion" is lifted, verbatim, from section
706(b) of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Section
626(d)(1) of the ADEA establishes three possible
deadlines for a charge: within 180 days after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred, within 300 days of
such an occurrence in a state with its own antidiscrimination law, or within 30 days after receipt of
notice of the termination of such state proceedings.
These are the identical deadlines earlier provided in
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section 706(e) of Title VII, and much of the wording is
the same. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
But this Court has repeatedly held that Title VII
does not bar those employees from bringing a section
1983 action under the Equal Protection Clause to
redress employment discrimination on the basis of
race. That well-established interpretation of Title VII
is largely dispositive of the dispute regarding the effect of the ADEA on section 1983 actions. In a series
of decisions over a period of four decades, this Court
has repeatedly held that Title VII does not preclude
either section 1983 equal protection claims or claims
under other federal anti-discrimination statutes. That
rule applies not only to state and local government
workers, but also to employees of private employers,
who may - in addition to claims under Title VII assert claims under section 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Shortly before the ADEA was amended in 1974 to
apply to state and local government employees, the
Court pointed out in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
that "legislative enactments in this area have long
evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination." 415 U.S. at
4 7. Alexander cited as examples of that congressional
practice "42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866)
[and] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871)." 415
U.S. at 47 n.7. "Title VII was designed to supplement
rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions
relating to employment discrimination." 415 U.S. at
48-49. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 459 (1975), reiterated that interpretation of
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Title VII. Johnson explained that under this wellestablished body of law, "[ w ]here conduct is covered
by both section 1981 and Title VII, ... a plaintiff is
free to pursue a claim by bringing suit under § 1981
without resort to th[e] [Title VII] statutory prerequisites." North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982), held that Title VII does not preclude claims
under Title IX asserting gender-based discrimination
in employment. "[T]he school boards insist that the
victims of employment discrimination have remedies
other than those available under Title IX.... [E]ven if
alternative remedies are available ... this Court
repeatedly has recognized that Congress has provided
a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate employment discrimination." 456 U.S. at 535 n.26.
"Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual
clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses
and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief."
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181
(1989). In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S.
442 (2008), the defendant objected that if section 1981
were interpreted to encompass retaliation claims,
plaintiffs able to file suit under section ·1981 could
skip the exhaustion requirements in Title VII, and
would be able to obtain remedies greater than those
authorized by Title VII. This Court rejected that
contention as inconsistent with the long-recognized
intent of Congress to accord to discrimination victims
access to several distinct and overlapping remedies.
"Precisely the same kind of Title VIII§ 1981 'overlap'
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and potential circumvention exists in respect to
employment-related direct discrimination. Yet Congress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct
employment discrimination .... In a word, we have
previously held that the 'overlap' reflects congressional design .... We have no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case." 553 U.S. at 454-55.
There is no reason to believe that Congress,
having determined that Title VII should supplement,
rather than supplant, other remedies for discrimination, claims, would have intended the ADEA to function in a different manner. Title VII and the ADEA
are parts of a single overall national policy to eradicate bias in the workplace. "The ADEA [was] enacted
in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional effort to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace.... The
ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to
protect employees in the workplace nationwide. See
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., ... (race, color, sex, national origin, and religion); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . ... (disability); .... ; the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (sex)." McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357
(1995). The existence of independent, overlapping
remedies has for decades been a hallmark of that
congressional scheme. The national policy to prevent
and correct age discrimination in employment, like
the similar policy regarding discrimination on the
basis of race, deliberately involves a range of overlapping prohibitions and remedies.
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III. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT
VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE QUESTION PRESENTED
This case provides an excellent vehicle for resolving the question presented. The Third Circuit dismissed Hildebrand's section 1983 constitutional claim
expressly, and solely, based on its view that the ADEA
bars section 1983 claims for age-based equal protection violations. The Third Circuit decision, although
incorrect, presents a significantly more detailed
analysis than previous decisions adopting the majori.ty view. As a result, the issues raised by the question
presented have now been more thoroughly aired in
the lower courts than was true when this Court
granted certiorari in Madigan v. Levin.

--------·-------CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents three issues on which we
have not previously ruled in a precedential opinion.
First, whether an employee terminated from a local
government position may maintain an action for age
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second,
whether the pleading of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA''),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, must satisfy the standards
established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). And third, whether a complainant's submission of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's revised Intake Questionnaire
constitutes the filing of a charge of discrimination.
As to the first question, we hold that a state or
local government employee may not maintain an age
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
must instead proceed under the ADEA. As to the
second question, we hold that a plaintiff is not obligated to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies
with particularity, but may instead allege in general
terms that the required administrative process has
been completed. And finally, we hold that the EEOC
Intake Questionnaire, revised in the wake of Federal
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 128 S.Ct.
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1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008), when properly completed, constitutes a charge of discrimination.
As a result of our holdings, we will affirm the
District Court's dismissal of Appellant Anthony
Hildebrand's § 1983 claims but we will vacate the
District Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA claim
against the Allegheny County District Attorney's
Office as Hildebrand submitted a properly completed
Intake Questionnaire to the EEOC within the deadline for filing a charge of discrimination, and Hildebrand
adequately
pled
the
exhaustion
of
administrative remedies. Finally, we will affirm the
dismissal of the ADEA claims against Appellee Allegheny County because it was not named on the
Intake Questionnaire, and was not identified as a
respondent to an age discrimination charge until
after the deadline for filing a charge of discrimination
against it had passed.

I.

Background

Anthony Hildebrand was employed as a detective
for the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office
("DA's Office") for five years before he was terminated
on February 18, 2011. Prior to his work at the DA's
Office, Hildebrand spent fifteen years as an undercover narcotics detective with the Pittsburgh Police
Department.
On February 18, 2011, Hildebrand received a
letter suspending him without pay for five days
pending discharge, and announcing his termination
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effective that day. He filed an internal grievance, but
the termination was ultimately upheld.
Hildebrand maintains that his termination was
part of "a well-known and established practice to
push out older workers through termination or
forced resignation." (Appellant's Br. 5.) He contends
that he became a victim of age-based discrimination
beginning in 2009 when he was assigned a new
supervisor who, he asserts, demoted him because of
his age despite his satisfactory work performance.
As part of his demotion, Hildebrand states that he
was insulted on the basis of his age and relocated to
an inferior workplace. He further alleges that the
discrimination he faced was part of a hostile work
environment that transcended the conduct of any
one employee.
On December 1, 2011, Hildebrand completed an
Intake Questionnaire ("the Intake Questionnaire")
with the EEOC, indicating that he was the victim
of discrimination on the basis of his age. He also
checked a box on the Intake Questionnaire authorizing the EEOC to investigate his claim and indicating
that he "want[ed] to file a charge of discrimination."
(EEOC Br. 3.) Subsequently, on January 11, 2012,
Hildebrand completed a "Charge of Discrimination"
with the EEOC, naming the Allegheny County District Attorney as the respondent. The EEOC issued a
right-to-sue letter on May 7, 2012, and Hildebrand
filed suit on August 7, 2012.
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Hildebrand's complaint named Allegheny County
("the County"), as well as the DA's Office, as defendants. His complaint asserted violations of the ADEA,
Title VII (retaliation), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (asserting
violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to agebased discrimination, as well as violation of his First
Amendment free speech rights), the Pennsylvania
Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 1421-1428, and
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat.
§§ 951-963. His complaint also alleged:
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under
section 706 of Title VII, have occurred or
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim
of employment discrimination with the
[EEOC]. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right
to Sue. This Complaint is filed within 90
days of such Notice of Right to Sue.
(A.2.)

The County and the DA's Office (collectively,
"Appellees") separately filed motions to dismiss. On
December 7, 2012, the District Court granted the
motions to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim. The
District Court also applied the pleading standards set
forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, to Hildebrand's
assertion that he satisfied all conditions precedent to
filing suit under the ADEA. Analyzing Hildebrand's
complaint in light of the lqbal/Twombly standard, the
District Court stated:
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Because [the complaint] fails to provide any
facts, i.e. specific dates, as to when Plaintiff
raised his claim with the EEOC and when
the EEOC issued its right to sue letter to
Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff failed to attach his Right to Sue to the Complaint, ...
the Complaint falls short of providing the
facts to establish whether he has adequately
exhausted his administrative remedies.
(A.l12.) Accordingly, the Court dismissed the ADEA
claim without prejudice. The District Court also
dismissed Hildebrand's section 1983 claims without
prejudice.
Hildebrand filed an amended complaint, alleging
with greater particularity that he satisfied all conditions precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. Specifically, he averred that he had filed a timely charge of
discrimination, the EEOC had issued a right-to-sue
letter, and he had filed the complaint within 90 days
of notice of the right-to-sue. He attached his charge of
discrimination and the EEOC right-to-sue letter to
the amended complaint.
Appellees each filed motions to dismiss the
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Hildebrand's- charge was untimely because it was filed
more than 300 days after the last date of discrimination. Allegheny County also urged the District Court
to dismiss Hildebrand's ADEA claim against the
County on the additional ground that the charge of
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discrimination named only the DA's Office as a defendant.
Hildebrand attached to his responses to the
motions his completed EEOC Intake Questionnaire.
He contended that the completed Intake Questionnaire constitutes a charge and was filed within 300
days of the last date of discrimination.
On January 4, 2013, the District Court dismissed
Hildebrand's amended complaint. The District Court
first dismissed the ADEA claim, concluding that
Hildebrand did not file a "charge of discrimination"
with the EEOC within the requisite 300 days of the
last date of discrimination. Specifically, the District
Court found that the last date of alleged discrimination was Hildebrand's February 18, 2011 termination,
and that the charge of discrimination filed on January 11, 2012 was therefore untimely. Thus, the District Court concluded that Hildebrand failed to
sufficiently plead that he timely filed his claim with
the EEOC "in light of the lqbal!Twombly standard."
(A.307.) Finding that further amendment would be
futile, the District Court dismissed the ADEA claim
with prejudice.
As to his § 1983 claims, the District Court held
that Hildebrand failed to state a plausible claim
against Allegheny County under a theory of municipal liability, because he did not plead sufficient facts
to support a plausible inference that the County had
adopted a custom or practice of age discrimination.
The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claims
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against the DA's Office based on Hildebrand's concession that it was not a separate entity from the County
for purposes of § 1983. Finally, having dismissed with
prejudice all claims arising under federal law, the
District Court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining claims asserted under
the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

II.

Discussion

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over a decision granting a motion to
dismiss. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121,
128 (3d Cir.2010). Accordingly, "[w]e may affirm the
district court on any ground supported by the record."
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir.1999).

A. Hildebrand's § 1983 Age Discrimination Claim
We turn first to Hildebrand's claim brought
under § 1983 that Appellees discriminated against
him on the basis of his age, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Allegheny County argues that the District Court
properly dismissed this § 1983 cause of action, contending that "[t]he ADEA 'is the exclusive remedy
for claims of age discrimination in employment.'"
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(Allegheny Cnty. Br. 19 (quoting Ahlmeyer v. Nev.
Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th
Cir.2009))). For the reasons that follow, we agree.
1.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Rather than conferring any substantive rights,
section 1983 "provides a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114
(1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Nevertheless, § 1983 is a statutory remedy and
Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace
it with an alternative remedy." Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746
(1984), superseded by statute, Education of the
Handicapped Act, § 615(e)(4) as amended, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(4). Thus, "[s]ection 1983 claims are not
available ... where Congress has evinced an intent to
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preclude such claims through other legislation."
Ahlmeyer; 555 F.3d at 1055.
In determining whether a statutory enactment
precludes suit under § 1983, "[t]he crucial consideration is what Congress intended." Smith, 468 U.S. at
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Congressional intent to preclude § 1983 claims may be inferred "[ w ]hen the
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are
sufficiently comprehensive." Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 2021, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). In Sea
Clammers, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
was precluded from bringing a§ 1983 suit for damages under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976),
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976). 453
U.S. at 20-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615. Emphasizing the
"unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of the
statutory framework, id. at 13, 101 S.Ct. 2615, the
Court concluded that "[a]llowing parallel § 1983
claims to proceed ... would have thwarted Congress'
intent in formulating and detailing these provisions."
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246,
253, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009).
The Supreme Court has also held that § 1983
suits were precluded by statute in a case where a
plaintiff sought vindication of a constitutional rather than a statutory- right. See Smith, 468 U.S.
992, 104 S.Ct. 3457. In Smith, plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection
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Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting a
deprivation of the right to "a free appropriate public
education" for their handicapped child. Id. at 1009,
104 S.Ct. 3457. Focusing once again on the "comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees" set
forth in the statute's remedial scheme, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to "leave
undisturbed the ability of a handicapped child to go
directly to court with an equal protection claim to a
free appropriate public education." Id. at 1011, 104
S.Ct. 3457. Permitting such suits, the Court observed,
would "[a]llow[] a plaintiff to circumvent" congressional intent. Id. at 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457.
Subsequently, in Rancho Palos ~rdes v. Abrams,
544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005),
the Court again found that a comprehensive remedial
statutory framework precluded suit under § 1983.
The plaintiff in Rancho Palos Verdes filed suit under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and for damages
under § 1983. Id. at 115, 125 S.Ct. 1453. Applying its
prior decisions in Sea Clammers and Smith, the
Court ruled that the Telecommunications Act's remedial scheme would be "distort[ed]" by direct enforcement through§ 1983. Id. at 127, 125 S.Ct. 1453.
Most recently, the Court considered whether Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a), precludes § 1983 claims of sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 249, 129 S.Ct. 788. In Fitzgerald, the plaintiffs alleged that their daughter, then an
elementary school student, suffered several incidents
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of sexual harassment by another student while on the
school bus, and that the school's response to their
allegations had been inadequate. Id. at 250, 129 S.Ct.
788. The plaintiffs brought suit, asserting that their
daughter had suffered sex discrimination in violation
of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional
claims, holding that Title IX provided the sole remedy
for sex discrimination in the education context. Id. at
251, 129 S.Ct. 788. The Supreme Court reversed. Id.
Reiterating that "the crucial consideration is what
Congress intended," id. (citation omitted), the Court
signaled that its analysis of congressional intent
might differ depending upon whether the right asserted under § 1983 arises from a statute or the
Constitution:
In those cases in which the § 1983 claim is
based on a statutory right, evidence of such
congressional intent may be found directly in
the statute creating the right, or inferred
from the statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
§ 1983. In cases in which the § 1983 claim
alleges a constitutional violation, lack of congressional intent may- be inferred from a
comparison of the rights and protections of
the statute and those existing under the
Constitution. Where the contours of such
rights and protections diverge in significant
ways, it is not likely that Congress intended
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to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights.

Id. at 252-53, 129 S.Ct. 788 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Notwithstanding the distinction between statutorily-created rights and constitutionally-conferred
rights, the Court emphasized that, "[i]n determining
whether a subsequent statute precludes enforcement
of a federal right under § 1983 ... primary emphasis
[is placed] on the nature and extent of that statute's
remedial scheme." Id. This was true even where
plaintiffs, such as those in Smith, "relied on§ 1983 to
assert independent constitutional rights," rather than
statutory rights. Id. Indeed, the Court observed that
in each of the cases where it found a statute to be the
exclusive remedy for an asserted right, "the statutes
at issue required plaintiffs to comply with particular
procedures and/or to exhaust particular administrative remedies prior to filing suit," and "'[a]llowing a
plaintiff to circumvent' the statutes' provisions [by
suing directly under § 1983] would have been 'inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme.'" Id.
at 254-55, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457).
_ Turning to the question of whether Title IX
precludes suit under § 1983 for sex discrimination,
the Court first found that Title IX does not provide a
comprehensive enforcement scheme, emphasizing
that Title IX's "remedies - withdrawal of federal
funds and an implied cause of action - stand in stark
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contrast to the 'unusually elaborate,' 'carefully tailored,' and 'restrictive' enforcement schemes of the
statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes." !d. at 255, 129 S.Ct. 788. The
Court observed that Title IX does not contain an
administrative exhaustion requirement or a notice
provision. Id. Affording particular weight to Title IX's
lack of an express private right of action, the Court
noted that it "has never held that an implied right of
action had the effect of precluding suit under§ 1983."
!d. Given the absence in Title IX of a detailed remedial scheme, the Court concluded that "parallel and
concurrent § 1983 claims will neither circumvent
required procedures, nor allow access to new remedies." Id. at 255-56, 129 S.Ct. 788. The Court found
further support for its conclusion that gender discrimination covered by Title IX could be pursued by way
of a § 1983 suit by analyzing "the substantive rights
and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 256, 129 S.Ct.
788. The Court found that "Title IX's protections are narrower in some respects and broader in others." Id.
For instance, Title IX exempts several activities that
can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause,
such as discrimination in admissions decisions of
elementary and secondary schools, and all activities
of military service schools, as we11 as traditionally
single-sex public colleges. Id. at 257, 129 S.Ct. 788.
Additionally, the Court cited incongruous standards
for establishing liability under Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause, explaining that, while "a Title IX
plaintiff can establish school district liability by
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showing that a single school administrator with
authority to take corrective action responded ... with
deliberate indifference," the same plaintiff would be
required to show a municipal policy, custom, or practice under § 1983. Id. at 257-58, 129 S.Ct. 788. Because of this disparity in coverage, as well as Title
IX's lack of a comprehensive enforcement framework,
the Fitzgerald Court concluded that, in passing Title
IX, Congress did not intend to preclude sex discrimination claims in the context of education under
§ 1983. Id. at 258, 129 S.Ct. 788.

2.
Prior to Fitzgerald, a number of our sister Courts
of Appeals had held that the ADEA precludes § 1983
claims of age discrimination. See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d
at 1057; Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742 (1st
Cir.2003); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (lOth
Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds by Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110, 120
S.Ct. 928, 145 L.Ed.2d 806 (2000); Lafleur v. Tex.
Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1997);
Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C.Cir.1991);
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 868 F.2d 1364
(4th Cir.1989). The Seventh Circuit- the only Court
of Appeals to consider this question after Fitzgerald -,however, reached the opposite conclusion. See Levin v.
Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (2012).
The leading case concluding that the ADEA
precludes § 1983 claims of age discrimination is
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Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, 868 F.2d
1364. See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056. In Zombro, the
Fourth Circuit held that Congress intended the
ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for claims of age
discrimination, reasoning that private causes of
action brought directly under § 1983 "would severely
undermine, if not debilitate, the enforcement mechanism created by Congress under the ADEA." 868 F.2d
at 1369. Zombro focused on the ADEA's comprehensive statutory scheme, which "was structured to
facilitate and encourage compliance through an
informal process of conciliation and mediation." Id. at
1366. Providing a plaintiff with "direct and immediate access to the federal courts" via § 1983 could
result in "the comprehensive administrative process .... be[ing] bypassed, and the goal of compliance
through mediation.... be[ing] discarded." Id. Given
these concerns, the Zombro court reached what it
deemed "[t]he inescapable conclusion" that the ADEA
precludes suits under § 1983 for age discrimination.
Id. at 1366-67.
Mter Zombro, the Courts of Appeals for the First,
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits
agreed. See Tapia-Tapia~ 322 F.3d at 745; Lafleur, 126
F.3d at 760; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057; Migneault,
158 F.3d at 1140; Chennareddy, 935 F.2d at 318. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzgerald,
however, the Seventh Circuit diverged from this
consensus view, concluding instead that the ADEA
does not preclude constitutional claims of age
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discrimination asserted under § 1983. Levin, 692 F.3d
at 617.
While recognizing that "the ADEA sets forth a
rather comprehensive remedial scheme," id. at 618,
Levin interpreted Fitzgerald as setting a higher bar
for inferring preclusive intent in cases where a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation. Id. To imply
congressional intent to preclude constitutional claims,
the Levin court held that "some additional indication
of congressional intent" is required. Id. at 619. Emphasizing that the ADEA lacks express language
evincing congressional intent to preclude§ 1983 suits,
Levin considered the statute's purpose. The court
reasoned that "the ADEA does not purport to provide
a remedy for violation of constitutional rights," but
rather, "it provides a mechanism to enforce only the
substantive rights created by the ADEA itself." Id. at
619 (citing Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1373 (Murnaghan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Levin then distinguished
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, which found
that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), Pub.L. 94-142, precluded suit under § 1983
for a Constitutional violation, explaining that the
IDEA was passed to address the constitutional requirement to provide a public education for handicapped children. Id. at 619. Without express language
addressing preclusion, and "absent any additional
indication from Congress," the Levin Court declined
to infer an intent to preclude constitutional claims of
discrimination. Id. at 620. The court in Levin then
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compared the rights and protections offered by the
ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause, and found
several significant differences: first, an ADEA plaintiff may sue only an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, whereas a § 1983 plaintiff is free
to sue any individual who "caused or participated in
the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights"; second, the ADEA limits claims by certain
individuals, such as elected officials, who are not
exempted from bringing suit under§ 1983; and third,
unlike under § 1983, state employees are effectively
barred from bringing suit under the ADEA because
their employers are shielded by Eleventh Amendment
immunity. !d. at 621. In light of these differences, and
in the absence of express congressional intent to the
contrary, the Levin court concluded that the ADEA is
not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination
claims. Id. at 621-22.

3.
We agree with the Levin court that the issue of
whether the ADEA precludes a§ 1983 cause of action
for age discrimination in employment presents a
"close call." Id. at 617. Contrary to Levin, however, we
conclude that, on balance, the relevant considerations
weigh in favor of finding that the ADEA does indeed
bar such § 1983 claims.
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that
the comprehensiveness of a statute's remedial scheme
is the primary factor in determining congressional
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intent. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 253, 129 S.Ct. 788
("[W]e have placed primary emphasis on the nature
and extent of [a] statute's remedial scheme.") (emphasis added). Fitzgerald reaffirms the Court's jurisprudence on this issue as articulated in Sea
Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes. Id. at
254, 129 S.Ct. 788 (observing that, in each of prior
cases, "[o]ffering plaintiffs a direct route to court via
§ 1983 would have circumvented [the relevant statute's comprehensive] procedures."). Indeed, Fitzgerald
cited with approval the Court's statement in Sea
Clammers that, "[ w ]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive,
they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent
to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. at
253, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Sea Clammers, 453 U.S.
at 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615) (emphasis added). To be sure,
Fitzgerald's analysis of the different substantive
protections afforded by Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause provides an additional framework for
determining whether a section 1983 cause of action is
foreclosed. Nevertheless, we do not believe it disturbed the basic principle that, absent indications to
the contrary, we may infer that Congress intended to
preclude § 1983 claims when it provides a sufficiently
comprehensive remedial scheme for the vindication of
a federal constitutional right.
Thus, we cannot agree with Levin that Congress
must provide some "additional indication" of its
intent. Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. Fitzgerald does not
suggest the need for a statement of "clear or manifest
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congressional intent in either the language of the
statute or the legislative history," as Levin requires.
See Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. Rather, Fitzgerald reaffirmed the principle that, where a statute imposes
procedural requirements or provides for administrative remedies, permitting a plaintiff to proceed directly to court via § 1983 would be "inconsistent with
Congress' carefully tailored scheme." Fitzgerald, 555
U.S. at 255, 129 S.Ct. 788 (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at
1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457).
Here, there can be no debate that the ADEA
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme. Under
the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to, among
other things, "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's age." 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA expressly provides a
private right of action to employees. Id. § 626(c).
Before an employee may file suit under the ADEA,
however, a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC. Id. § 626(d)(l). The EEOC is then
directed to notify all respondents named in the employee's charge of discrimination and. to "promptly
seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by
informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion." Id. § 626(d)(2). Unless the EEOC elects
to file suit to enforce the employee's claim, an employee may commence suit sixty days after filing a
charge. Id. §§ 626(c)(l), (d)(l). In light of these requirements, we agree with the majority of our sister
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Courts of Appeals that this scheme would be undermined if plaintiffs could sue directly under § 1983.
See, e.g., Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366 ("[Under § 1983,
the] plaintiff would have direct and immediate access
to the federal courts, the comprehensive administrative process would be bypassed, and the goal of compliance through mediation would be discarded.").
Moreover, we do not believe that the rights and
protections of the ADEA and the Equal Protection
Clause differ in such significant ways as to demonstrate congressional intent to allow parallel § 1983
claims alleging age discrimination. The ADEA is
intended to "promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Under the Equal Protection Clause, age classifications receive only rational
basis review. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)
("States may discriminate on the basis of age without
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification -in question is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."). By prohibiting "arbitrary
age discrimination," the ADEA encompasses the
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment,
while significantly expanding prohibitions on age
discrimination elsewhere.
Although, as the Levin court emphasizes, the
potential defendants are different under the ADEA
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and § 1983, 1 we do not believe this distinction significant enough to demonstrate congressional intent to
permit both claims. Additionally, we think the fact
that certain government employees are either exempted from the ADEA, or limited to certain remedies, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f), demonstrates
congressional intent to specifically define the rights of
those employees rather than to permit such employees to circumvent these limitations by filing directly
under§ 1983. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 15, 101
S.Ct. 2615 ("In the absence of strong indicia of a
contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to
conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.").
"We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on§ 1983 as a remedy for
a substantial equal protection claim." Smith, 468 U.S.
at 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Because we believe, however,
that § 1983 suits are "inconsistent with Congress'
carefully tailored scheme," id., we join the majority of
Courts of Appeals in concluding that Congress intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for
claims of age discrimination in employment. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of
Hildebrand's § 1983 claim of age discrimination.
1

Under the ADEA, a plaintiff may sue his employer, an
employment agency, or a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 623.
In contrast, a § 1983 plaintiff can sue an individual whose
actions caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Kuhn v.
Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555-56 (7th Cir.2012).
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B. Hildebrand's § 1983 Retaliation Claims
Hildebrand seeks vindication for two additional
alleged violations under § 1983, contending that he
was retaliated against for his use of the internal
grievance process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that he was retaliated
against on the basis of his political patronage in
violation of the First Amendment. The District Court
dismissed these allegations along with Hildebrand's
§ 1983 age discrimination claim, finding that he had
failed to adequately plead that the County adopted a
custom or practice of such discrimination. The District Court also found, albeit in a footnote, that Hildebrand's amended complaint "fail[ed] to pinpoint
with any clarity which of his Constitutional rights
were negatively impacted by [Allegheny County],"
that the allegations of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations were conclusory in nature, and that
they therefore "fail[ed] to meet the lqbal/Twombly
standard." (A. 313 n. 5.) As to the claims of retaliation, we agree with the District Court's analysis.
Hildebrand brought each of these claims against
Allegheny County under a theory of municipal liability, which requires him to demonstrate either that the
County officially adopted a "policy," or unofficially
adopted a "custom," of unconstitutional discrimination. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978). Hildebrand concededly proceeded on all
§ 1983 claims under a "custom" theory. "A plaintiff
may establish a custom ... by showing that a given
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course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed
or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law." Watson v. Abington Twp., 4 78 F. 3d 144, 155-56 (3d Cir.2007) (citing
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480
(3d Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In his amended complaint, Hildebrand made the
following averments of retaliation: he alleged that he
was retaliated against by the Chief Detective and the
Assistant Chief Detective at the DA's Office after he
made a good faith report expressing concerns about a
fellow detective (A. 136 'II 'II S-T); that he was similarly
retaliated against by the same individuals after
reporting a concern about the Office's procedure for
charging drug crimes (!d. 138 'II X); that he was
retaliated against by the Assistant Chief Detective
after he filed an internal grievance against him
alleging age-based harassment (!d. 139-40 '!I'll BBDD); that he was subsequently demoted in retaliation
for his complaints about the drug charging procedures (!d. 142 'II JJ); and that he was harassed after
members of the DA's Office learned that he had
previously made political contributions to Joan Orie
Melvin in her candidacy for the Pennsylvania Su-.
preme Court (!d. 145-46 'II WW). Notwithstanding
these allegations of retaliation and harassment on
the part of certain high-ranking officials at the DA's
Office, Hildebrand does not allege that Allegheny
County established a custom of retaliating against
supporters of Ms. Melvin, or against Hildebrand or
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other employees who utilized the internal grievance
process.
While Hildebrand's brief on appeal reasserts his
claim of retaliation, it does not point to any facts
demonstrating that there existed a custom in Allegheny County to retaliate against employees on these
bases. Rather, the portion of Hildebrand's brief dedicated to discussing his allegations in support of
municipal liability relate solely to his claims of age
discrimination. We therefore agree with the District
Court that Hildebrand failed to set forth a plausible
claim for relief against Allegheny County for retaliation, and we will affirm their dismissal on that basis.

C. Hildebrand's ADEA Claims
Having determined that Hildebrand's § 1983
claims were properly dismissed, we now turn to the
District Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA
claim.
1. Whether the lqbal/Twombly Plead-

ing Standards Apply to Fed.R.Civ.P.
9(c)

A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must
exhaust his or her administrative remedies as mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Section 626(d) requires
plaintiffs in "deferral states" such as Pennsylvania,
which have a state agency with authority to investigate claims of employment discrimination, to file
charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the last
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date of alleged discrimination. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)(2)
& 633(b); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d
851, 854 (3d Cir.2000). A plaintiff's obligation to
timely file with the EEOC is a condition precedent to
filing suit under the ADEA. Seredinski v. Clifton
Precision Prods. Co., Diu. of Litton Sys., Inc., 776 F.2d
56, 64 (3d Cir.1985) (Sarokin, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
The pleading of a condition precedent is governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), which provides:
Conditions Precedent. In pleading conditions
precedent, it suffices to allege generally that
all conditions precedent have occurred or
been performed. But when denying that a
condition precedent has occurred or been
performed, a party must do so with particularity.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c).
Here, Hildebrand's original complaint alleged:
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under
section 706 of Title VII, have occurred or
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim
of employment discrimination with the
_[EEOC]. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right
to Sue. This complaint is filed within 90 days
of such Notice of Right to Sue.
(A.2.)
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The District Court dismissed Hildebrand's ADEA
claim, holding that he failed to sufficiently plead the
satisfaction of this condition precedent. Specifically,
the District Court applied the pleading standards set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal, which held that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to
allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937.
The District Court erred by applying Iqbal and
Twombly to Hildebrand's pleading of the conditions
precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. Iqbal and
Twombly interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
S(a), which governs the standard for pleading a claim
for relief. The pleading of conditions precedent is
governed by Rule 9(c), not Rule S(a). Neither Iqbal
nor Twombly purport to alter Rule 9. We see no
indication that those cases sought to override the
plain language of Rule 9(c), and we therefore conclude
that the pleading of conditions precedent falls outside
the strictures of Iqbal and Twombly.

2. The Intake Questionnaire
Our conclusion that the District Court erred in
applying Iqbal and Twombly to the pleading of conditions precedent does not end our inquiry. Following
the dismissal of his first complaint, Hildebrand filed
an amended complaint, which alleged his satisfaction
of the ADEA's conditions precedent in greater detail.
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Specifically, Hildebrand alleged that he had filed a
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the last
date of discrimination. He attached his charge of
discrimination to his amended complaint.
In their motions to dismiss the amended complaint, Appellees contested Hildebrand's asserted
final date of discrimination, contending that the last
date of discrimination was his February 18, 2011
termination. Under this reasoning, Hildebrand's
charge of discrimination, which he filed on January
11, 2012, would be untimely. In response to the motions to dismiss, Hildebrand argued that the EEOC
Intake Questionnaire, which he filed on December 1,
2011, constituted a timely-filed charge of discrimination.
The District Court dismissed Hildebrand's ADEA
claims with prejudice, concluding that the last date of
discrimination was February 18, 2011, and that the
January 11, 2012 charge was therefore untimely. The
District Court did not consider the Intake Questionnaire. 2 We agree that Hildebrand's Intake Questionnaire constitutes a timely filed charge.

2

Hildebrand concedes that the Intake Questionnaire was
not attached to his amended complaint. He did, however, submit
the questionnaire as an exhibit to his response to Allegheny
County's motion to dismiss. While a court is limited to considering the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we are
satisfied that the Intake Questionnaire was properly before the
District Court. There was no dispute as to its authenticity, and it
directly corroborated Hildebrand's claim that he had satisfied
(Continued on following page)
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An EEOC filing constitutes a charge of discrimination if it satisfies the requirements of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1626.6, and can "reasonably [be] construed as a
request for [the EEOC] to take remedial action to
protect the employee's rights." Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170
L.Ed.2d 10 (2008). In Holowecki, the Supreme Court
adopted a "permissive" interpretation of the charge
requirement, explaining that a "wide range of documents," including an intake questionnaire, "may be
classified as charges." I d. at 402, 128 S.Ct. 114 7.
Following Holowecki, the EEOC revised its
Intake Questionnaire to require claimants to check a
box to request that the EEOC take remedial action.
This box, commonly referred to as "Box 2," states:
I want to file a charge of discrimination, and
I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above. I understand
that the EEOC must give the employer, union, or employment agency that I accuse of
discrimination information about the charge,
including my name ....
(A.262, 291). Under the revised form, an employee
who completes the Intake Questionnaire and checks
the conditions precedent to filing suit under the ADEA. See
Mayer u. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.2010) ("In deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public
record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the
complainant's claims are based upon these documents.").
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Box 2 unquestionably files a charge of discrimination.
Hildebrand did precisely this. Additionally, Hildebrand's questionnaire is dated December 1, 2011,
which is within 300 days of the February 18, 2011
letter of suspension and notice of termination. Thus,
it was timely filed.
The Intake Questionnaire did not, however,
preserve Hildebrand's claim against Allegheny County. As the County observes, Hildebrand's EEOC
Intake Questionnaire names "Allegheny County
District Attorney's Office" as the only respondent.
Thus, it fails to allege any discrimination on the part
of the County. We will therefore vacate the District
Court's dismissal of Hildebrand's ADEA claim as to
the DA's Office because the Intake Questionnaire was
a timely filed charge of discrimination, but we will
affirm dismissal of the ADEA claim against Allegheny
County, because the Intake Questionnaire demonstrates that Hildebrand failed to timely exhaust his
administrative remedies as to the County.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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Appellant
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ALLEGHENY COUNTY, a political
entity; ALLEGHENY COUNTY
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JUDGMENT

(Filed Jun. 27, 2014)
This cause came to be considered on the record
from the United States District Court for the Western
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District of Pennsylvania and was argued on November 7, 2013. On consideration whereof, it is now
hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that
the order of the District Court entered January 4,
2013 be and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED in part
and VACATED in part. Costs shall not be taxed in
this matter. All of the above in accordance with the
Opinion of this Court.
ATTEST:
s/ Marcia M. Waldron,
Clerk
Dated: June 27, 2014
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY HILDEBRAND,
12cv1122

Plaintiff,

ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

v.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
ALLEGHENY COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Filed Jan. 4, 2013)
For the second time, there are two separate
Motions to Dismiss before this Court. This time, the
Motions seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (doc. no. 15) which was filed subsequent to this
Court's prior Opinion and Order (doc. nos. 13 and 14)
granting in part Defendants' prior Motions to Dismiss, but allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to file an
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint on December 13, 2012. Doc. no. 15.
Defendant Allegheny County (" AC") and Defendant Allegheny County District Attorney's Office
("DA's Office") filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See doc nos. 16 and 17, respectively. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to each
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Motion to Dismiss. See doc. nos. 21 and 23, respectively.
The matters are now ripe for adjudication.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal
courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the
heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) requires only "'a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds on which it
rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4 7
(1957)).
Building upon the landmark United States
Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Third, "whe[n] there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
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an entitlement for relief." This means that
our inquiry is normally broken into three
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the
claim, (2) reviewing the Complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking
at the well-pleaded components of the Complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry
are sufficiently alleged.

Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
The third step of the sequential evaluation
requires this Court to consider the specific nature of
the claims presented and to determine whether the
facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to
show a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at
210. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations." Id. at 210-11; see also Malleus,
641 F.3d at 560.
This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely
because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately
prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.
Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at
556. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides
adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where"
will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at
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212; see also Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc.,
346 F. App'x. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009).
In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be
granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 563 n.8.

II.

DISCUSSION - DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
TO DISMISS 1
A. Count I -Age Discrimination ("ADEA")

Defendant AC argues that Count I of the Complaint- Plaintiff's ADEA claim- should be dismissed
because: (1) Plaintiff filed his EEOC charge against
the DA's Office, not AC; and (2) Plaintiff failed to
timely file his EEOC charge within three hundred
days of the last discriminatory act thereby failing to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing
this lawsuit. Defendant DA's Office similarly argues
that Plaintiff's ADEA claim should be dismissed

1

As noted in its prior Opinion, because the Court writes
primarily for the parties who are familiar with the details of this
case, and because the Court accepts all well-pled facts set forth
in Plaintifrs Amended Complaint as true for purposes of
deciding these Motions to Dismiss, the Court has declined to
provide a separate recitation of the relevant facts as pled by
Plaintiff. To the extent the Court found that the recitation of
any of the facts was necessary, those facts have been set forth
within the individual sub-parts of the "Discussion" section
herein.
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because he failed to timely file his EEOC complaint
within 300 days of the last discriminatory act.
Because both parties raised the timeliness of the
filing of Plaintiff's EEOC charge as one of the bases
upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's ADEA claim, the
Court will address that matter first. As this Court
previously noted, a party seeking relief for employment discrimination under Title VII must first establish that he timely filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
that he received a right to sue letter, and that he filed
his Complaint in Federal Court within ninety days of
his receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the
EEOC. See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough
of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). The
ADEA requires a person to file a "charge of discrimination" with the EEOC:
(A) within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred; or
(B) in a case to which section 633(b) of
this Title applies, within 300 days after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within
30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination proceedings under state
law, whichever is earlier.
29 U.S.C. § 626(d). "Like Title VII, [the] ADEA has
deferral provisions and the time for filing a charge
depends on whether deferral applies. In deferral
states, such as Pennsylvania, the charge must be
filed within 300 days of the allegedly illegal act."
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Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 382-3 (3d Cir.
2007), quoting Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods.
Co., 776 F.2d 56, 63 (3d Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted).
Thus, a judicial complaint under the ADEA will
be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies if the supporting EEOC charge was not filed
within 300 days of notification to the employee of the
adverse employment action.
Turning to this case, the Court begins by noting
that in its prior Memorandum Opinion, the Court
stated it would issue an Order granting Defendant
AC's Motion to Dismiss the ADEA claim because
Plaintiff had merely pled a legal conclusion asserting
that he met "all conditions precedent" to filing an
ADEA claim. See doc. no. 13, p. 4. However, in this
same portion of the Opinion, this Court clearly indicated that despite the fact it was granting Defendant
AC's Motion to Dismiss the ADEA claim, it was doing
so "without prejudice to allow Plaintiff time to file an
Amended Complaint establishing the factual basis to
support the legal conclusion that he has exhausted
his administrative remedies." Id.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (doc. no. 15),
which was filed shortly after the Court issued its
prior Opinion, contains the following facts relevant
to the exhaustion and timeliness issue now re-raised
by Defendant AC and raised by Defendant DA's
Office:
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10. On February 18, 2011, the [DA's
Office] and AC terminated [Plaintiff's] employment.

*

*

*

[12.] NNN. On February 18, 2011,
[Plaintiff] was suspended for five (5) days
without pay. [Plaintiff] filed a grievance with
Dawn Botsford on March 8, 2011. The hearing lasted twenty (20) minutes. Botsford affirmed the five (5) day suspension of
[Plaintiff] without pay....

*

*

*

[12.] PPP. On March 31, 2011[,] the union voted not to appeal [Plaintiff's] grievance
and he was terminated on May 7, 2011.

*

*

*

The Termination of Detective Hildebrand
13. On or about February 1, 2011,
[Plaintiff] was suspended without pay for
unauthorized use of a government vehicle.
The automobile use resulted in [Plaintiff's]
termination on or about February 18, 2011.
14. [Plaintiff] was given no reason for
his termination in the February 18, 2011letter discharging him sent by Logan.
15. A March 14, 2011 letter sent [to]
[Plaintiff] by Dawn Botsford is when
Hildbrand first heard he was discharged for
lying to his supervisors in addition to his
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personal use of the DA supplied motor vehicle. Prior to this date, [Plaintiff] was advised
he was terminated only for unauthorized use
of a DA issued vehicle.
Doc. no. 15, Cfl«Jl 10, 12 NNN, 12 PPP, 13-15.
Plaintiff attached to his Amended Complaint,
several documents which this Court may also consider. Relevant to the exhaustion and timeliness
argument are his EEOC Charge of Discrimination
(hereinafter "Charge") ( Exhibit 1 to the Amended
Complaint, doc. no. 15-1), and a letter f:rom Dennis
Logan, Chief of Detectives, County of Allegheny,
Office of the District Attorney, dated February 18,
2011 (hereinafter "February 18, 2011 Letter"). Exhibit
3 to the Amended Complaint, doc. no. 15-3.
The Charge, prepared by Plaintiff and/or his
counsel, indicates that the document was filed on Jan
11, 2012. Doc. no. 15-1, p. 1. The document also
identifies the earliest date of discrimination as "0201-2011," and the latest date of discrimination as "0430-2011." Id. The relevant "particulars" set forth
within the Charge read as follows:
2. On February 18, 2011, Chief Dennis
Logan suspended me for five (5) days without
pay for unauthorized use of a government
vehicle. On April 30, 2011, Chief Dennis
Logan told me I was discharged for being untruthful.

!d.
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The February 18, 2011 Letter, signed by Chief
Dennis Logan, reads in pertinent part as follows:
I suspended you for five (5) days without
pay, pending discharge, effective February
11, 2011 for charges outlined in the Disciplinary Action Report ("DAR"), a copy of which
I gave to you on February 1, 2011. You were
given five (5) work days to respond in writingstating the reason or reasons why you should
not be discharged. I have received and read
your response letter and find it unsatisfactory. Therefore, you are terminated from employment with the Allegheny County District
Attorney's Office effective February 18,
2011 ....

- --- -----

Doc. No. 15-3.
As is evident from the statements made within
the four corners of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, as
well as within those documents attached to the
Amended Complaint, inconsistencies exist with
respect to the actual date of Plaintiff's termination. 2
However,. this Court notes that paragraphs 10, 13 and
14 of the Amended Complaint (quoted above) all
indicate that Plaintiff was terminated on February
2

In deciding Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
courts generally consider only the allegations in the Complaint,
exhibits attached to the Complaint, matters of public record, and
documents that form the basis of a claim. See In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997);
accord Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir.
2004).
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18, 2011, and these statements are corroborated by
the statement set forth within the February 18, 2011
Letter, attached to the Amended Complaint.
However, Plaintiff provided a few dates which
post-date Plaintiff's February 18, 2011 termination.
These can be found at paragraphs "12. NNN." and
"12. PPP." of the Amended Complaint as well as the
April 30, 2011 date set forth in the Charge. See doc
no. 15, 'II'II 12. NNN. and 12. PPP.; and doc. no. 15-1.
The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to provide any
facts in his Amended Complaint related to the April
30, 2011 date, which he identified in his Charge as
the "latest" date discrimination took place. In fact,
there is no mention of the April 30, 2011 date in the
Amended Complaint. Thus, the only information
related to the April 30, 2011 date is Plaintiff's statement found within the Charge where Plaintiff indicated that "Chief Dennis Logan told me I was
discharged for being untruthful." Doc. No. 15-1.
Plaintiff fails to explain how this statement allegedly
made on April 30, 2011 can be construed as an act of
age discrimination against Plaintiff.
In addition, sub-paragraphs "12. NNN."_ and "12.
PPP." provide facts concerning Plaintiff's termination
date which conflict with facts stated elsewhere in the
Amended Complaint and in the exhibits attached to
the Amended Complaint. Sub-paragraph "12. NNN."
indicates Plaintiff was suspended for five days on
February 18, 2011 - not terminated. Sub-paragraph
"12. PPP." reads that Plaintiff was terminated on May
7, 2011.
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Because this Court has already provided Plaintiff
with an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint
establishing the requisite factual basis upon which an
ADEA claim could survive a Motion to Dismiss for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and given
what counsel for Plaintiff has submitted, this Court
finds that there is no plausible basis upon which
Plaintiff's ADEA claim can proceed.
First, most of the assertions made by Plaintiff in
his Amended Complaint allege that the last act of
discriminatory conduct arose on February 18, 2011 the date Plaintiff was terminated from his employment - and this is corroborated by the February 18,
2011 Letter which Plaintiff attached to his Amended
Complaint.
Next, the Court further finds that the other,
seemingly contradictory, allegations concerning the
date of the last discriminatory act which Plaintiff
asserts in his Amended Complaint (and one of which
is set forth in his Charge), are either nondiscriminatory acts (i.e., Chief Logan stating to
Plaintiff on April 30, 2011, that he was discharged for
being untruthful)_ and/or are merely dates for which
Plaintiff provided no corroboration (i.e., the termination date ofMay 7, 2011).
Thus, in light of the lqbal/Twombly standard, the
Court finds that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and
attached documentation fail to adequately plead that
a timely ADEA claim was filed within three hundred
(300) days of the date of the last act of the alleged

44a

discrimination - Plaintiff's February 18, 2011 termination. In light of the factual assertions made by
Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint, the Court finds
that allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
Complaint a second time would be futile. 3
Accordingly, the Court is constrained to concur
with Defendants AC and DA's Office that Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint fails to provide facts necessary
to establish that he fimely [sic] filed is EEOC claim
within three hundred days of February 18, 2011.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss Count I ofthe Complaint, with prejudice. 4

B. Count III- Section 1983 Claim
This Court cited the following law in its prior
Opinion, and finds that a discussion of this law will

8

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted with
prejudice. See, In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997) (" ... a district court may exercise
its discretion and deny leave to amend on the basis of ...
futility.").
• In light of this determination, the Court will not address
Defendant AC's argument wherein it contends that because
Plaintiff failed to file the EEOC Charge against Defendant AC,
Defendant AC cannot be held legally liable for any viable ADEA
claim filed by Plaintiff. Similarly, the Court will not address
Defendant DA's argument that Plaintiff's Complaint was filed
with this Court two days too late, and thus, not timely filed
within ninety (90) days from the day he received his Right to
Sue Notice.
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again be revelant [sic] to the Defendants' Motions,
and thus, restates same herein:
Title 42 of the United States Code,
§ 1983 states that, "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In Kneipp v. Tedder, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
explained that "[s]ection 1983 does not, by its
own terms, create substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere in the Constitution or
federal laws[,]" and held that "[i]n order to
establish a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States [and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d 1199,
1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Municipalities, such as Defendant AC,
can be subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell
v. Dept. of Soc. Sues. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (Local governing bodies
... can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
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where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers.). "[A]lthough the
touchstone of the § 1983 action against a
government body is an allegation that official
policy is responsible for a deprivation of
rights protected by the Constitution, local
governments, like every other § 1983 'person,' by the very terms of the statute, may be
sued for constitutional deprivations visited
pursuant to governmental 'custom' even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official
decisionmaking channels." Id. at 690-91.
However, Section 1983 "did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort[,] [i]n
particular, we conclude that a municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory." ld. at 691.
In essence, Monell created a "two-path
track" to municipal liability, depending on
whether a plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is
premised on a municipal policy or a custom.
See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966,
971 (3d Cir. 1996). In Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990),
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit provided greater clarity concerning on these two sources of liability:
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Policy is made when a
"decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action" issues
an official proclamation, policy, or
edict. . . . A course of conduct is
considered to be a "custom" when,
though not authorized by law, "such
practices of state officials [are] so
permanent and well-settled" as to
virtually constitute law.

ld. at 1480 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690) (internal
citations omitted).
Under either the policy or the custom
track, "a plaintiff must show that an official
who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation
of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled
custom." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845,
850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d
at 1480); see also, Watson v. Abington
'Iiunshp., 4 78 F. 3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007).
In order to determine who has policymaking
responsibility, "a court must determine
which official has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action."
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.
Doc. no. 13, pp. 8-9.
1. Liability - Defendant DA Office

In its prior Opinion, this Court acknowledged in
a footnote that Defendant DA's Office had argued that
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it was not a separate entity from Defendant AC for
purposes of Section 1983 liability and cited caselaw in
support of this argument. Id., pp. 10-11, n.2. The
Court also noted that Plaintiff did not directly address this argument and requested that ''both parties
. . . more fully brief the specific issue of whether
Defendant DA's Office can be subject to Section 1983
liability." Defendant DA's office renewed this argument in its current Brief in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss (see doc. no. 18, p. 7), and Plaintiff, acknowledging that Defendant DA re-raised this issue, has
now conceded that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has "held that local prosecutorial offices are not legal entities separate from the local
governments of which they are a part ... and consequently, cannot be sued under [Section] 1983." Doc.
no. 23, p. 11, citing Briggs v. Moore, 251 Fed. Appx.
77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007); cert. den., 553 U.S. 1057 (2008).
Accordingly, based on the law of this Circuit,
Defendant DA's Office cannot be sued under Section
1983.

2. Liability - Defendant AC
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim may only be asserted against Defendant AC, the municipal entity.
As noted above, there are two means of demonstrating the required causal link between a municipal
"policy" and an alleged constitutional violation. First,
a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
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officers" will suffice. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988). Second, even if a policy has
not received approval through "official decisionmaking
channels," customs or practices may be the basis for
municipal liability if they are so permanent and well
settled that they operate as law. See Kelly v. Borough
of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Jiminez
v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2007). That is, "acquiescence in a long-standing
practice or custom" that "constitutes the standard
operating procedure of the local governmental entity"
is grounds for holding a municipality liable. Jett v.
Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737
(1989), abrogated on other grounds by statute, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1977(a).
Applied here, Plaintiff had to set forth facts in
his Amended Complaint to plausibly allege that
either: (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
-body's officers violated his constitutional rights, or
(2) no "policy" received approval through "official
decisionmaking channels," but Defendant AC had
customs or practices which were "so permanent and
well settled" that they operated as law.
Because Plaintiff's initial Complaint failed to
make these requisite allegations, the Court granted
Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss but allowed Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to make the
necessary changes to preserve his Section 1983 claim.
See doc. no. 13, p. 6. Defendant AC now contends that
the Amended Complaint fails to allege the necessary
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facts to establish a plausible claim under Section
1983. Doc. no. 19, pp. 9-11. This Court agrees.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint did set forth the
names and positions of those who created and enforced the allegedly illegal custom or practice of
Defendant AC. The Amended Complaint identified
Dawn Botsford, Dennis Logan, and Richard Ealing as
"top decisionmakers" within the DA's Office concerning personnel and disciplinary matters, and it claims
they were involved in terminating Plaintiff. Doc. no.
15, 'II 12 C.-E. Plaintiff also alleged that each of these
three individuals were employees of Defendant AC.
I d.
The law is clear that Defendant AC cannot be
held liable merely because it employed the three
. individuals whom Plaintiffhas identified. Monell, 436
U.S at 691. There were two ways in which Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint could assert a Section 1983
violation against Defendant AC. First, Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint could have set forth facts to
plausibly establish that these "decisionmakers" were
officers of Allegheny County who officially adopted
and promulgated a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation or decision on behalf of Allegheny County
which violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 and City of St. Louis 485 U.S.
at 121. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not so
allege. See doc. no. 15.
Second, under Monell and its progeny, Plaintiff
could have alleged facts to plausibly establish that
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Defendant AC's three employees engaged in a "course
of conduct" which came to be considered "a custom."
Id. Plaintiff would also have had to allege that,
although not authorized by law, the practices of the
three "officials [were] so permanent and well-settled"
as to virtually constitute law. Id.
Defendant AC contends that Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint fails to make the necessary factual assertions described above. In response, Plaintiff argues
that the three AC employees (Botsford, Logan, and
Ealing), "engaged in a campaign, [via an] unwritten
policy/custom to 'rid the [DA's Office] and AC offices of
older employees." Doc. no. 21, p. 9. Plaintiff claims his
Amended Complaint alleges that this "campaign" was
"widespread" in that younger workers were given
overtime, as well as better work areas and vehicles.
Id. The Court notes that Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition does not cite any paragraphs within his Amended
Complaint pinpointing where he provides facts in
support of these assertions.
Moreover, the Court notes that upon its own
review of the Amended Complaint, in sub-paragraphs
"12. ZZ." through "12. CCC.," Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant AC (through two employees, Logan and
Ealing) assigned overtime to "younger employees"
and further alleges that this was done purely for
retaliatory and discriminatory reasons despite Plaintiff's seniority and "right of first refusal" to accept an
overtime assignment. Doc. no. 15, '1I 12. ZZ.-CCC.
Plaintiff offers no further details concerning how
frequently Plaintiff's overtime work was assigned to
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younger employees (which would have established
the persistence of the alleged course of conduct), nor
does he provide any specific facts to indicate how
many other "older" employees were subject to this
treatment (which would have established the pervasiveness of the alleged course of conduct). Thus,
Plaintiff has not provided enough facts to support the
legal conclusion that the practices of the three "officials [were] so permanent and well-settled" as to
virtually constitute law.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed
to plead a plausible claim under Section 1983 against
Defendant AC given the less than adequate facts
necessary to establish a plausible claim. The Court
finds that the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint in this regard are largely
conclusory in nature and thus, fail to meet the
lqbal/Twombly standard. 5
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's Section
1983 cannot be prosecuted against Detendant DA's
5

In addition, although the Court has determined that
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint falls short of asserting facts
necessary to assert a plausible claim against Defendant AC
under Monell and its progeny, the Court also notes that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to pinpoint with any clarity
which of his Constitutional rights were negatively impacted by
Defendant AC. Doc. no. 15, '11'11 30-33. The Court finds that the
allegations made by Plaintiff claiming violations of his Fourteenth and First Amendment rights to be conclusory in nature,
and such assertions also fail to meet the lqbal/Twombly standard.
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Office, because it is not an entity separate from
Defendant AC for Section 1983 purposes, and because
the Court finds that Plaintiff's Section 1983 allegations raised against Defendant AC fall short of meeting the lqbal/Twombly standard, the Court will grant
both Defendants' Motions to Dismiss this claim.

C. All Remaining Claims (Count II Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law,
and Counts IV and V - Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act Violations)
Because Plaintiff's only remaining claims are
state-law based claims under the Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law and the PHRA, jurisdiction may
be relinquished by this Court. The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims. The state courts are intimately
familiar and regularly adjudicate claims pertaining
to the Whistleblower Law and the PHRA. Accordingly, said state law claims will be dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), albeit without prejudice to
Plaintiff's ability tore-file these claims in state court.
Also, the dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims
should not work to Plaintiff's disadvantage. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing for at least a thirty-day
tolling of any applicable statute of limitation after the
claim is dismissed so as to allow Plaintiff the necessary time to re-file his state law claims in state
court).

54a
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing law and authority, the
Court will enter an appropriate Order consistent with
this Opinion wherein the Court has held as follows:
( 1) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint will be GRANTED, WITH
PREJUDICE, as to: (1) Count I, Plaintiff's ADEA
claim; and (2) Count III, Plaintiff's Section 1983
claim for the reasons set forth above.

(2) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint will be GRANTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as to Count II (Plaintiff's Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV and
Count V (Plaintiff's PHRA claims), because this
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over these remaining state law claims. Plaintiff's
ability to re-file these claims in state court will not
impaired by this dismissal, as 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
provides for at least a thirty-day tolling of any applicable statute of limitation after the claim is dismissed.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc: All Registered ECF Counsel
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY HILDEBRAND,
Plaintiff,
v.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
ALLEGHENY COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE,

12cv1122
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

Defendants.

ORDER
(Filed Jan. 4, 2013)
AND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2013, for the
reasons discussed in the Court's Memorandum Opinion filed contemporaneously with this Order, and
based up on the law and authority cited therein,
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (doc. nos. 16 and 17)
will be GRANTED as follows:
1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED,
WITH PREJUDICE, as to Count I, Plaintiff's ADEA
claim and Count III, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.

2. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as to Count II (Plaintiff's
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV
and Count V (Plaintiff's PHRA claims), because this
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Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over these remaining state law claims.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc: All Registered ECF Counsel
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2012 WL 6093798
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
W.D. Pennsylvania.
Anthony HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff,
v.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Allegheny County
District Attorney's Office, Defendants.
No. 12cv1122. I Dec. 7, 2012.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARTHUR J. SCHWAB, District Judge.
Before the Court are two separate Motions to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant Allegheny
County ("AC") has filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),
while Defendant Allegheny County District Attorney's
Office ("DA's Office") filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss
(seeking dismissal of Counts II, III and IV) under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). See doc
nos. 7 and 5, respectively. Plaintiff filed a Brief in
Opposition to each Motion to Dismiss. See doc. nos. 12
and 9, respectively.
The matters are now ripe for adjudication.
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I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Motions Filed Under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6)

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal
courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the
heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2) requires only "'a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds on which it
rests."' Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)).
Building upon the landmark United States
Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Third, "whe[n] there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement for relief." This means that
our inquiry is normally broken into three
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the
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claim, (2) reviewing the Complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking
at the well-pleaded components of the Complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry
are sufficiently alleged.

Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
The third step of the sequential evaluation
requires this Court to consider the specific nature of
the claims presented and to determine whether the
facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to
show a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at
210. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations." Id. at 210-11; see also Malleus,
641 F.3d at 560.
This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely
because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately
prevail on the merits. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8.
Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at
556. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides
adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where"
will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at
212; see also Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc.,
346 F. App'x. 774, 776 (3d Cir.2009).
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In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be
granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 563 n. 8.

B. The Motion Filed Under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(f)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a
party to seek to have stricken from any pleading "an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent or scandalous matter."

II.

DISCUSSION - DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
TO DISMISS 1
A. Count I -Age Discrimination ("ADEA")

A party seeking relief for employment discrimination under Title VII must first establish that he
timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), that he received
a right to sue letter, and that he filed his Complaint
m Federal Court within ninety days of a [sic] his
1

Because the Court writes primarily for the parties who
are familiar with the details of this case, and because the Court
accepts all well-pled facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint as
true for purposes of deciding these Motions to Dismiss, the
Court has declined to provide a separate recitation of the
relevant facts as pled by Plaintiff. To the extent the Court found
that the recitation of ay [sic] of the facts was necessary, those
facts have been set forth within the individual sub-parts of the
"Discussion" section herein.
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receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the
EEOC. See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough
of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.2001). The
ADEA requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within three hundred days of
the alleged discriminatory act.
Defendant AC argues that Count I of the Complaint - Plaintiff's ADEA claim under Title VII should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this
lawsuit. Plaintiff counters by arguing that his Complaint, specifically paragraph three, alleges enough
factual information under the lqbal/Twombly standard to survive this Motion to Dismiss.
Paragraph three of the Complaint reads as
follows:
All conditions precedent to jurisdiction under
section 706 of Title VII,· have occurred or
been complied with. Plaintiff filed a claim of
employment discrimination with the [EEOC].
The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue.
The Complaint is filed within 90 days of such
Notice of Right to Sue.
Doc. no. 1, Cj[ 3. A copy of the Right to Sue letter was
not attached to the Complaint.
Because paragraph three and the remainder of
the Complaint fails to provide any facts, i.e. specific
dates, as to when Plaintiff raised his claim with the
EEOC and when the EEOC issued its right to sue
letter to Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff failed to
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attach his Right to Sue to the Complaint, this Court
is constrained to concur with Defendant AC that the
Complaint falls short of providing the facts to establish whether he has adequately exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendant AC's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the
Complaint, but will do so without prejudice to allow
Plaintiff time to file an Amended Complaint establishing the factual basis to support the legal conclusion that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies.

B. Count II blower Law

Pennsylvania's Whistle-

The pertinent sections of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law read as follows:
(a) Persons not to be discharged.-No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise
discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location or privileges of
employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a
good faith report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or
waste.
(b) Discrimination prohibited.-No employer
may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee
regarding the employee's compensation,
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terms, conditions, location or privileges of
employment because the employee is requested by an appropriate authority to participate in an investigation, hearing or
inquiry held by an appropriate authority or
in a court action.
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1423.
The following words and phrases when used
in this act shall have the meanings given to
them in this section unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

*

*

*

"Good faith report." A report of conduct defined in this act as wrongdoing or waste
which is made without malice or consideration of personal benefit and which the person
making the report has reasonable cause to
believe is true.

*

*

*

"Whistleblower." A person who witnesses or
has evidence of wrongdoing or waste while
employed and who makes a good faith report
of the wrongdoing or waste, verbally or in
writing,- to one of the person's superiors, to
an agent of the employer or to an appropriate authority.
"Wrongdoing." A violation which is not of
a merely technical or minimal nature of
a Federal or State statute or regulation,
of a political subdivision ordinance or
regulation or of a code of conduct or
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ethics designed to protect the interest of
the public or the employer.
43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1422.
Each of the Defendants contend that Plaintiff's
Complaint fails to adequately assert a cause of action
for violation of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, 43
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1421 et seq. However, each Defendant
has a slightly different basis for their respective
position.
Defendant AC suggests that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege facts which establish "wrongdoing'' and/or "good faith report" within the meaning of
the Whistleblower Law.
Defendant DA's Office contends that: (1) the facts
alleged by Plaintiff in support of the "wrongdoing''
prong of the Whistleblower Law do not constitute
"wrongdoing" as that term is defined; (2) the Complaint itself demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to
make a "good faith report" within the meaning of the
Whistleblower Law; and (3) Plaintiff failed to assert
the causal connection between his whistleblowing and
his termination.
In response to the arguments made by both
Defendants, Plaintiff contends that paragraph 11, at
subparagraphs H-I, L, S-Y, and DDD ofhis Complaint
provide the requisite facts necessary to support a
plausible claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower
Law.
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This Court does not entirely agree with either
Plaintiff or Defendants.
First, this Court acknowledges that the Whistleblower Law's definition of "wrongdoing'' encompasses
more than technical violation of a Federal or State
statute. It can also encompass a violation of a regulation, a code of conduct, or ethics "designed to protect
the interest of the public or the employer." Although a
violation can be inferred, generally, from the allegations set forth in paragraph 11 of the Complaint
(when read as a whole), the law under Iqbal and
Twombly requires more than that. To be in compliance with Iqbal, Plaintiff's Complaint needs to definitively state what statute, regulation, code of conduct,
or ethics code was violated by one or both Defendants.
Second, Plaintiff's Complaint falls short of clearly drawing the causal connection between the alleged
good faith report of the alleged wrongdoing and the
Defendants' alleged reprisal. Although it can be
inferred that the alleged good faith reports preceded
the alleged reprisal, the Complaint is not clear on this
point, and precision and clarity are required by the
Iqbal/Twombly standard.
Finally, because the "good faith" component of
the Whistleblower Law is driven, in part, by the
definition of wrongdoing, it is premature to determine
whether Plaintiff's allegations that he made alleged
"good faith" reports of wrongdoing are sufficient
under Iqbal!Twombly. For all of these reasons, the
Court will grant the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
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Count II of the Complaint, but will do so without
prejudice to allow Plaintiff time to file an Amended
Complaint.

C. Count III - Title VII of Civil Rights
Act: Retaliation
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has recently summarized the body of law
surrounding Title VII as follows:
Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices based upon an individual's
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff carries the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817,
36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie
case, a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1)
he belongs to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for
the position; 3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and 4) the adverse action was under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Sarullo u. U.S. Postal Seru., 352 F.3d 789, 797
(3d Cir.2003). A defendant can rebut the claim by
presenting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the employment action. Id. The plaintiff must
then "establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer's proffered reasons were merely a
pretext for discrimination." Id.
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Young v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
Fed.Appx. 150, 153 (3d Cir.2011).

427

In their Briefs in Support of Dismissal, both
Defendants correctly noted that Title VII applies to
those individuals who believe they suffered some
form of discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Doc. No. 8, p. 5, and Doc. No. 6, p.
3. Both Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not
allege any discriminatory acts on the part of either
Defendant predicated upon Plaintiff's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Plaintiff conceded
in one of his Briefs in Opposition that he incorrectly
asserted his retaliation claim under Title VII. Doc.
No. 10, p. 9.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Retaliation claim predicated upon Title VII.

D. Count IV - First and Fourteenth
Amendments: Equal Protection
Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 states
that, "[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Kneipp v. Tedder, the United States Court of
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Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that "[s]ection
1983 does not, by its own terms, create substantive
rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of
rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or
federal laws[,]" and held that "[i]n order to establish a
section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d
Cir.1996) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Municipalities, such as Defendant AC, can be
subject to § 1983 liability. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Sues. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
(Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly
under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.).
"[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action
against a government body is an allegation that
official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution, local governments, like
every other § 1983 'person,' by the very terms of the
statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking
channels." Id. at 690-91. However, Section 1983 "did
not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
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action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort[,][i]n particular,
we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691.
In essence, Monell created a "two-path track" to
municipal liability, depending on whether a plaintiff's
Section 1983 claim is premised on a municipal policy
or a custom. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d
966, 971 (3d Cir.1996). In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir.1990), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided
greater clarity concerning on these two sources of
liability:
Policy is made when a "decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action" issues
an official proclamation, policy, or edict .... A
course of conduct is considered to be a "custom" when, though not authorized by law,
"such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well-settled" as to virtually constitute law.

Id. at 1480 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690) (internal
citations omitted).
Under either the policy or the custom track, "a
plaintiff must show that an official who has the power
to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a
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well-settled custom." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d
845, 850 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at
1480); see also, Watson v. Abington Twnshp., 4 78 F.3d
144, 156 (3d Cir.2007). In order to determine who has
policymaking responsibility, "a court must determine
which official has final, unreviewable discretion to
make a decision or take an action." Andrews, 895 F.2d
at 1481.
Here, both Defendants argue that the Complaint
fails to allege facts which could support either theory
- i.e., that a policy or a custom was in place which
violated Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Defendant DA's Office also contends that it is
not a "person" under Section 1983, and further argues
that Plaintiff failed to allege a causal connection
between his termination and his exercise of his First
Amendment rights.
In his Briefs in Opposition to the Defendants'
respective Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff relies on the
allegations found in paragraph eleven to support his
contention that he has adequately identified a policy
or custom which violated Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Doc. No. 10, p. 11 and Doc.
No. 12, p. 10. Plaintiff's Complaint contains an
allegation whereby various, specifically-identified
individuals, one of whom is classified as Plaintiff's
"direct supervisor," "began an official campaign to rid
the [Defendants'] offices of older employees ...." Doc.
No. 1, 'fi11(B). Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges that
Plaintiff's direct supervisor and one other specifically-identified individual failed to provide him with
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overtime and "better" work space and automobiles
due to his age and made "public comments in the
office about needing to get rid of the older employees."
Doc. No. 1, «Jl«Jl ll(FF)-(II). However, the Complaint
fails to allege or identify a specific policy the name of
the person who terminated Plaintiff's employment.
See Doc. No. 1, «Jl 10, ("On February 18, 2011, the
[Defendants] terminated [Plaintiff's] employment.").
Moreover, nowhere in his Complaint does Plaintiff allege that either of these individuals are
"decisionmakers" with the final authority to establish
a policy. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege which of
these individuals (if either of them) had the power to
acquiesce to the alleged well-settled custom of discriminating against older employees. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Complaint is deficient with
regard to his Section 1983 claim, and will grant both
of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, without prejudice, in this regard. 2
2

The Court acknowledges Defendant DA Office's argument
that it is not a separate entity from Defendant County and thus,
not a separate entity subject to Section 1983 liability. In support
of this position, Defendant DA's Office cited caselaw. The Court
notes that Plaintiff did not directly address this argument nor
the caselaw cited in his Brief in Opposition. If Plaintiff chooses
to file an Amended Complaint and continues to assert the
Section 1983 claim against Defendant DA's Office, and if Defendant DA's Office files a Motion to Dismiss the Section 1983
claim from the Amended Complaint, the Court would urge both
parties to more fully brief the specific issue of whether Defendant DA's Office can be subject to Section 1983 liability. At this
point in time, the Court declines to rule on the issue of whether
(Continued on following page)
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E. Counts V and VI - Pennsylvania Human Relations Act Violations
Defendant AC was the only Defendant to file a
Motion to Dismiss Counts V and VI of the Complaint,
both of which allege that Plaintiff's rights under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA") were
violated. Defendant AC notes that nowhere in either
of these two Counts does the Plaintiff assert any
allegations against Defendant AC.
Plaintiff concurs that Counts V and VI "inadvertently refer to only [Defendant DA's Office] and not
[Defendant AC]." Doc. No. 12, p. 12. However, Plaintiff argues that by incorporating all prior averments
he has preserved his PHRA claims against Defendant
AC.ld.
The Court will grant Defendant AC's Motion to
Dismiss these two Counts, without prejudice, thereby
allowing Plaintiff time to amend his pleading in this
regard should he choose to do so.

F. Punitive Damages
Both Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not
entitled to recover punitive damages under the
ADEA, Title VII, or Pennsylvania's Whistleblower
Defendant DA's Office is an entity subject to Section 1983
liability, due to the fact that it has decided that Plaintiff's
Complaint currently lacks enough factual information to sustain
a plausible cause of action against either Defendant.
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Law. In addition, both Defendants claim they are
immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. 3
Plaintiff concedes the following: (1) punitive
damages are unavailable to him under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law; (2) Defendants are immune
from punitive damages under Section 1983; and (3)
he has no viable Title VII claim. Doc. No. 10, pg. 9
and Doc. no. 12, p. 13. Given these concessions,
Plaintiff's recovery of any punitive damage award
against either Defendant would be limited to his
ADEAclaim.
In this regard, Plaintiff concedes that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not
ruled on whether punitive damages are available
under the ADEA. Thus, this Court may obtain guidance from other courts within the Third Circuit and
the body of case law on this issue from other Circuits.
Recently, in Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2011 WL
3607458,-(W.D .Pa. August 16, 2011), Judge McVerry
noted the following when granting U.S. Steel's Motion
to Dismiss Kelly's punitive damages from his ADEA
claim:

3

Plaintiff did not seek punitive damages under his PHRA
claims, presumably because such damages are unavailable
under the PHRA. See, Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 749
(Pa.l998) (''While punitive damages also serve to deter, simply
put, we do not consider punitive damages to be consistent with
the remedial nature of the Act.").
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Defendant likewise contends that Kelly may
not recover punitive damages under the
ADEA. Although the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed this issue, all of the courts of appeals
which have done so have denied claims for
punitive damages in ADEA cases. See Bruno
v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966-67
(lOth Cir.1987) (collecting cases from other
circuits). Several members of this Court and
a number of our sister courts within the
Third Circuit have denied claims for punitive
damages under the ADEA as well. See, e.g.,
Zurik v. Woodruff Family Services, 2009 WL
4348826, at *1 (2009 W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009);
Baldwin v. Peake, 2009 WL 1911040, at *3
(2009 W.D. Pa. July 1, 2009); Steward v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 F.Supp.2d 719, 730
(E.D.Pa.2004). The Court finds those decisions persuasive and agrees that the ADEA
does not authorize claims for punitive damages.

Kelly at *3.
Based on Plaintiff's concessions, coupled with
this Court's Opinion that punitive damages are not
available to Plaintiff under the ADEA, the Court
finds that Plaintiff may not pursue punitive damages
against either Defendant. Accordingly, Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss punitive damages from this case
will be granted.
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F. Compensatory Damages

Both Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes,
that Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages
for pain, suffering, humiliation, emotional distress,
and anxiety under the ADEA. See Watcher v. Pottsville Area Emerg. Med. Sues., Inc., 248 Fed.Appx. 272,
277 (3d Cir.2007) (a plaintiff cannot recover liquidated damages for pain and suffering under the ADEA),
citing Rodriguez v.. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d
Cir.1977). See also Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir.1977) (" ...
we hold that damages for 'pain and suffering' or
emotional distress cannot properly be awarded in
ADEA cases.").
Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' claim for compensatory damages pursuant
to the ADEA will be granted.

III. DISCUSSION - DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO STRIKE
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(0.
As two Courts in this district have noted:
The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean
up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial
matters." Natale v. Winthrop Resources Corp.,
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Civil Action No. 07-4686, 2008 WL 2758238
at *14 (E.D.Pa. July 9, 2008) (quoting
Mcinerney v. Moyer Lumber and Hardware,
Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402 (E.D.Pa.2002).
While "[a] court possesses considerable discretion in disposing of a motion to strike under Rule 12(0," such motions are "not
favored and usually will be denied unless the
allegations have no possible relation to the
controversy and may cause prejudice to one
of the parties, or if the allegations confuse
the issues in the case." Id. (quoting River
Road Deuel. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., Civ. A.
No. 89-7037,1990 WL 69085, at *2 (E.D.Pa.
May 23, 1990). Striking some or all of a
pleading is therefore considered a "drastic
remedy to be resorted to only when required
for the purposes of justice." I d. (quoting DeLa
Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428
(E.D.Pa.2007) (quotations omitted).

See Thornton v. UL Enterprises, 2010 WL 1004998, at
*1 (W.D.Pa. March 16, 2010) (Cohill, J.), quoting
Adams v. County of Erie, Pa., 2009 WL 4016636, at *1
(W.D.Pa. Nov, 19, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.).
Turning to the facts of this case, Defendant DA's
office contends that paragraph 11, subparagraphs
(ZZ) through (CCC) should be stricken because they
do not contain information pertinent to any of the
claims alleged by Plaintiff. These paragraphs read as
follows:
ZZ. In early January 2010, Hildebrand overheard a conversation between ADA Claus
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and Investigator Graber where Claus made
incriminating statements concerning the
Senator Jane Orie case. Claus and Graber
knew Hildebrand overheard this conversation
because they got quiet after they first saw
Hildebrand and moved away from him.
AAA. In December, 2009 an informal memo
was issued by DAs office that any and all political files on DA's computers were to be
a [sic] erased. Hildebrand spoke with ADA
Darryl Parker who advised Hildebrand he
was ordered by Zappala personally to come
in on December 24, 2009 to delete his political files by the DA himself. It is believed and
averred this action was taken in response to
a freedom of information request filed by
Jane Orie's attorney seeking to have all political files on the district attorney's office computers be produced under the freedom of
information act.
BBB. In January 2010 the DA computers
were to be sanitized from political references
by outside consultant, Fran Zovko. This was
done to double check and make sure all political files contained on the DA's computers
would be removed before Ms. Botsford responded to the freedom of information request made by Jane Orie or her attorneys.
CCC. Darryl Parker advised Hildebrand he
complained to Dawn Botsford that the DA's
practice of wiping clean political references
from computers was an obstruction of justice
and was wrong and should not be done. Darryl
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Parker was advised to keep his mouth shut
and just do as he was told. Hildebrand had
no political files on his computer and did not
need to comply with the D.Ns request.
Doc. No. 1, 'II ll(ZZ)-(CCC).
In response to Defendant DA Office's argument,
Plaintiff contends that once his contributions to the
Orie family became known to his superiors in the
workplace the harassment and discrimination against
him intensified. See Doc. No. 10, p. 15. Plaintiff
claims the averments found in subparagraphs 1 l(ZZ)
through (CCC) bear "reasonable relations" to support
Plaintiff's First Amendment and Whistleblower
claims. Doc. No. 10, p. 15. However, aside from making this blanket statement, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant DA Office's Motion to Strike fails
to provide any clear explanation of how the allegations found in these four subparagraphs support his
First Amendment or his Pennsylvania Whistleblower
Law claim.
The Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint
alleges that Defendants hired Plaintiff in 2005 to
work as a detective for the Allegheny County District
Attorney's Investigation Unit. Doc. No. 1, 'II 9. Plaintiff claims that starting in 2009, Defendants "began
an official campaign to rid [Defendants'] offices of
older employees .... " Id. 'II ll(B). The majority of the
remaining subparagraphs to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint provide additional details and allegations concerning what Defendants did and did not do
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to "rid [Defendants'] offices of older employees[,]" and
Plaintiff in particular. See CJI ll(C)-(YY).
Recalling that the purpose of a motion to strike is
to "clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and
avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters,"
and while this Court is (generally) not inclined to
grant a Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f), facts pled
here in subparagraphs ll(ZZ) through ll(CCC) appear
to have no relation to the controversy. In addition, the
Court finds that these allegations may cause prejudice to Defendant DA's Office and confuse the overarching issues and claims presented by Plaintiff in
the case.
For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant DA Office's Motion to Strike subparagraphs
ll(ZZ) through (CCC).
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing law and authority, the
Court will enter an appropriate Order consistent with
this Opinion wherein the Court has held as follows:
(1) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss will be
GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to: (1) Count III,
Plaintiff's Title VII Claim; (2) Plaintiff's demand for
a punitive damage award; and (3) Plaintiff's demand
for compensatory damages under the ADEA.
(2) Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss
will be GRANTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to
Count I (Plaintiff's ADEA claim), Count II (Plaintiff's
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Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law claim), Count IV
(Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim) and Counts V and VI
(Plaintiff's PHRA claims) of the Complaint.
(3) Defendant DA's Office Motion to Strike
subparagraphs ll(ZZ) through (CCC) will also be
GRANTED.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action
for deprivation of rights
Effective: October 19, 1996
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any actiori brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. Proceedings
in vindication of civil rights
Effective: September 22, 2000
(a)

Applicability of statutory and common law

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles
13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
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rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
(b)

Attorney's fees

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of
this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
[ 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or
section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailin~ party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held
liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless
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such action was clearly in excess of such officer's
jurisdiction.
(c)

Expert fees

In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of
this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the
court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as
part of the attorney's fee.

29 U.S.C. § 211. Collection of data
(a)

Investigations and inspections

The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data regarding the
wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of
employment in any industry subject to this chapter,
and may enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such transcriptions thereof), question
such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary
or appropriate to determine whether any person has
violated any provision of this chapter, or which may
aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in section 212 of this title and
in subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator
shall utilize the bureaus and divisions of the Department of Labor for all the investigations and inspections necessary under this section. Except as provided
in section 212 of this title, the Administrator shall
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bring all actions under section 217 of this title to
restrain violations of this chapter.
(b)

State and local agencies and employees

With the consent and cooperation of State agencies
charged with the administration of State labor laws,
the Administrator and the Secretary of Labor may, for
the purpose of carrying out their respective functions
and duties under this chapter, utilize the services of
State and local agencies and their employees and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, may reimburse such State and local agencies and their employees for services rendered for such purposes.
(c)

Records

Every employer subject to any provision of this chapter or of any order issued under this chapter shall
make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons
employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other
conditions and practices of employment maintained
by him, and shall preserve such records for such
periods of time, and shall make such reports therefrom to the Administrator as he shall prescribe by
regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for
the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter or
the regulations or orders thereunder. The employer of
an employee who performs substitute work described
in section 207(p)(3) of this title may not be required
under this subsection to keep a record of the hours of
the substitute work.
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(d)

Homework regulations

The Administrator is authorized to make such regulations and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting
industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate
to prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to
safeguard the minimum wage rate prescribed in this
chapter, and all existing regulations or orders of the
Administrator relating to industrial homework are
continued in full force and effect.

29 U.S.C. § 216. Penalties
Effective: May 21, 2008
(a)

Fines and imprisonment

Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 215 of this title shall upon conviction
thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000,
or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this
subsection.
(b) Damages; right of action; attorney's fees and
costs; termination of right of action
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to
the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
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additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any
employer who violates the provisions of section
215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement,
promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the
preceding sentences may be maintained against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such
a party and such consent is filed in the court in which
such action is brought. The court in such action shall,
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be
paid by the defendant, and costs of the action. The
right provided by this subsection to bring an action by
or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any
employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by
the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217
of this title in which (1) restraint is sought of any
further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum
wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under section 206 or section 207 of this title by an
employer liable therefor under the provisions of this
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subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as
a result of alleged violations of section 215(a)(3) of
this title.
(c) Payment of wages and compensation; waiver of
claims; actions by the Secretary; limitation of actions
The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment
of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime
compensation owing to any employee or employees
under section 206 or section 207 of this title, and the
agreement of any employee to accept such payment
shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by
such employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The Secretary may bring an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal
amount as liquidated damages. The right provided by
subsection (b) of this section to bring an action by
or on behalf of any employee to recover the liability
specified in the first sentence of such subsection and
of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any
such action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in an action under this subsection in which a recovery is sought of unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
under sections 206 and 207 of this title or liquidated
or other damages provided by this subsection owing
to such employee by an employer liable under the
provisions of subsection (b) of this section, unless
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such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion
of the Secretary. Any sums thus recovered by the
Secretary of Labor on behalf of an employee pursuant
to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit
account and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary of
Labor, directly to the employee or employees affected.
Any such sums not paid to an employee because of
inability to do so within a period of three years shall
be covered into the Treasury of the United States as
miscellaneous receipts. In determining when an
action is commenced by the Secretary of Labor under
this subsection for the purposes of the statutes of
limitations provided in section 255(a) of this title, it
shall be considered to be commenced in the case of
any individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party
plaintiff in the complaint, or if his name did not so
appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is
added as a party plaintiff in such action.
(d)

Savings provi&ions

In any action or proceeding commenced prior to, on,
or after August 8, 1956, no employer shall be subject
to any liability or punishment under this chapter
or the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [29 U.S.C.A. § 251
et seq.] on account of his failure to comply with any
-provision or provisions of this chapter or such Act
( 1) with respect to work heretofore or hereafter performed in a workplace to which the exemption in section 213(f) of this title is applicable, (2) with respect
to work performed in Guam, the Canal Zone or Wake
Island before the effective date of this amendment of
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subsection (d), or (3) with respect to work performed
in a possession named in section 206(a)(3) of this title
at any time prior to the establishment by the Secretary, as provided therein, of a minimum wage rate
applicable to such work.
Any person who violates the provisions
of sections 212 or 213(c) of this title, relating to child
labor, or any regulation issued pursuant to such
sections, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed(e)(l)(A)

$11,000 for each employee who was the subject of such a violation; or
(i)

(ii) $50,000 with regard to each such violation
that causes the death or serious injury of any
employee under the age of 18 years, which penalty may be doubled where the violation is a repeated or willful violation.

For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term
"serious injury" means (B)

permanent loss or substantial impairment of
one of the senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell,
tactile sensation);
(i)

permanent loss or substantial impairment
of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty, including the loss of all or part of
an arm, leg, foot, hand or other body part; or
(ii)

(iii) permanent paralysis or substantial impairment that causes loss of movement or mobility of
an arm, leg, foot, hand or other body part.
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(2) Any person who repeatedly or willfully violates
section 206 or 207, relating to wages, shall be subject
to a civil penalty not to exceed $1,100 for each such
violation.
(3) In determining the amount of any penalty under
this subsection, the appropriateness of such penalty
to the size of the business of the person charged and
the gravity of the violation shall be considered. The
amount of any penalty under this subsection, when
finally determined, may be (A) deducted from any sums owing by the United
States to the person charged;
(B) recovered in a civil action brought by the Secretary in any court of competent jurisdiction, in which
litigation the Secretary shall be represented by the
Solicitor of Labor; or
(C) ordered by the court, in an action brought for a
violation of section 215(a)( 4) of this title or a repeated
or willful violation of section 215(a)(2) of this title, to
be paid to the Secretary.
(4) Any administrative determination by the Secretary of the amount of any penalty under this subsection shall be final, unless within 15 days after receipt
of notice thereof by certified mail the person charged
with the violation takes exception to the determination that the violations for which the penalty is imposed occurred, in which event final determination of
the penalty shall be made in an administrative proceeding after opportunity for hearing in accordance
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with section 554 of Title 5, and regulations to be
promulgated by the Secretary.
(5) Except for civil penalties collected for violations
of section 212 of this title, sums collected as penalties
pursuant to this section shall be applied toward reimbursement of the costs of determining the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties, in
accordance with the provision of section 9a of this
title. Civil penalties collected for violations of section
212 of this title shall be deposited in the general fund
of the Treasury.

29 U.S.C. § 217. Injunction proceedings
The district courts, together with the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the District
Court of Guam shall have jurisdiction, for cause
shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this
·title, including in the case of violations of section
215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding
of payment of minimum wages or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to employees
under this chapter (except sums which employees are
barred from recovering, at the time of the commencement of the action to restrain the violations, by virtue
of the provisions of section 255 of this title).
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29 U.S.C. § 623. Prohibition of age discrimination
(a)

Employer practices

It shall be unlawful for an employer-

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in
order to comply with this chapter.
(b)

Employment agency practices

It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail
or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment
any individual on the basis of such individual's age.

(c)

Labor organization practices

It shallbe unlawful for a labor organization (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership,
or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his age;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for
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employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's
age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section.
(d) Opposition to unlawful practices; participation in
investigations, proceedings, or litigation
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate
against any individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant
for membership, because such individual, member or
applicant for membership has opposed any practice
made unlawful by this section, or because such individual, member or applicant for membership has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.

(e) Printing or publication of notice or advertisement indicating preference, limitation, etc.
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish, or
cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer
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or membership in or any classification or referral for
employment by such a labor organization, or relating
to any classification or referral for employment by
such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based
on age.
Lawful practices; age an occupational qualification; other reasonable factors; laws of foreign
workplace; seniority system; employee benefit plans;
discharge or discipline for good cause
(f)

It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization -

to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age, or where such practices involve an employee
in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such
employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which
such workplace is located;
(1)

(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade
the purposes of this chapter, except that no
such seniority system shall require or permit
the involuntary retirement of any individual
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specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan where, for each benefit or benefit
package, the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an
older worker is no less than that made or
incurred on behalf of a younger worker, as
permissible under section 1625.10, title
29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(i)

that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the
relevant purpose or purposes of this
chapter.
(ii)

Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such employee benefit plan or
voluntary early retirement incentive plan
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement
of any individual specified by section 631(a)
of this title, because of the age of such individual. An employer, employment agency,
or labor organization acting under subparagraph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall have the burden of
proving that such actions are lawful in any
civil enforcement proceeding brought under
this chapter; or
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(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
(g) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-239, Title VI,§ 6202(b)(3)(C)(i),
Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2233
(h) Practices of foreign corporations controlled by
American employers; foreign employers not controlled
by American employers; factors determining control
If an employer controls a corporation whose
place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any
practice by such corporation prohibited under this
section shall be presumed to be such practice by such
employer.
(1)

(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply
where the employer is a foreign person not controlled
by an American employer.
(3) For the purpose of this subsection the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation
shall be based upon the(A)

interrelation of operations,

(B)

common management,

(C)

~entralized

(D)

common ownership or financial control,

control of labor relations, and

of the employer and the corporation.
(i) Employee pension benefit plans; cessation or reduction of benefit accrual or of allocation to employee
account; distribution of benefits after attainment of
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normal retirement age; compliance; highly compensated employees
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
it shall be unlawful for an employer, an employment
agency, a labor organization, or any combination
thereof to establish or maintain an employee pension
benefit plan which requires or permits(1)

(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the
cessation of an employee's benefit accrual, or the
reduction of the rate of an employee's benefit accrual, because of age, or
(B) in the case of a defined contribution plan,
the cessation of allocations to an employee's account, or the reduction of the rate at which
amounts are allocated to an employee's account,
because of age.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor organization from observing any provision of an employee pension benefit plan to the extent that such
provision imposes (without regard to age) a limitation
on the amount of benefits that the plan provides or a
limitation on the number of years of service or years
of participation which are taken into account for purposes of determining benefit accrual under the plan.
(3) In the case of any employee who, as of the end of
any plan year under a defined benefit plan, has attained normal retirement age under such plan(A) if distribution of benefits under such plan
with respect to such employee has commenced as
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of the end of such plan year, then any requirement of this subsection for continued accrual of
benefits under such plan with respect to such
employee during such plan year shall be treated
as satisfied to the extent of the actuarial equivalent of in-service distribution of benefits, and
(B) if distribution of benefits under such plan
with respect to such employee has not commenced as of the end of such year in accordance
with section 1056(a)(3) of this title and section
401(a)(14)(C) of Title 26, and the payment of benefits under such plan with respect to such employee is not suspended during such plan year
pursuant to section 1053(a)(3)(B) of this title or
section 411(a)(3)(B) of Title 26, then any requirement of this subsection for continued accrual of
benefits under such plan with respect to such
employee during such plan year shall be treated
as satisfied to the extent of any adjustment in the
benefit payable under the plan during such plan
year attributable to the delay in the distribution
of benefits after the attainment of normal retirement age.

The provisions of this paragraph shall apply in accordance with regulations of the Secretary of the
Treasury. Such regulations shall provide for the application of the preceding provisions of this paragraph
to all employee pension benefit plans subject to this
subsection and may provide for the application of
such provisions, in the case of any such employee,
with respect to any period of time within a plan year.
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(4) Compliance with the requirements of this subsection with respect to an employee pension benefit
plan shall constitute compliance with the requirements of this section relating to benefit accrual under
such plan.
(5) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to
any employee who is a highly compensated employee
(within the meaning of section 414(q) of Title 26) to
the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of precluding
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees within the meaning of subchapter D of chapter 1 ofTitle 26.
(6) A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the
requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the subsidized portion of any early retirement benefit is disregarded in determining benefit accruals or it is a
plan permitted by subsection (m) of this section .. 1
(7) Any regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to clause (v) of section 411(b)(l)(H)
of Title 26 and subparagraphs (C) and (D) of section 411(b)(2) of Title 26 shall apply with respect to
the requirements of this subsection in the same
manner and to the same extent as such regulations
apply with respect to the requirements of such seetions 411(b)(1)(H) and 411(b)(2).

1

So in original.
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A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the
requirements of this section solely because such plan
provides a normal retirement age described in section
1002(24)(B) of this title and section 411(a)(8)(B) of
Title 26.
(8)

(9)

For purposes of this subsection(A) The terms "employee pension benefit plan",
"defined benefit plan", "defined contribution
plan", and "normal retirement age" have the
meanings provided such terms in section 1002 of
this title.
The term "compensation" has the meaning
provided by section 414(s) of Title 26.
(B)

(10)

Special rules relating to age

(A) Comparison to similarly situated younger
individual
(i)

In general

A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet
the requirements of paragraph (1) if a participant's accrued benefit, as determined as of
any date under the terms of the plan, would
be equal to or greater than that of any similarly situated, younger individual who is or
could be a participant.
(ii)

Similarly situated

For purposes of this subparagraph, a participant is similarly situated to any other individual if such participant is identical to such
other individual in every respect (including
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period of service, compensation, position,
date of hire, work history, and any other respect) except for age.
(iii) Disregard of subsidized early retirement benefits
In determining the accrued benefit as of any
date for purposes of this clause, the subsidized portion of any early retirement benefit
or retirement-type subsidy shall be disregarded.
(iv) Accrued benefit
For purposes of this subparagraph, the accrued benefit may, under the terms of the
plan, be expressed as an annuity payable at
normal retirement age, the balance of a hypothetical account, or the current value of
the accumulated percentage of the employee's final average compensation.
(B)

Applicable defined benefit plans
(i)

Interest credits
(I)

In general

An applicable defined benefit plan shall
be treated as failing to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) unless the
terms of the plan provide that any interest credit (or an equivalent amount) for
any plan year shall be at a rate which is
not greater than a market rate of return.
A plan shall not be treated as failing to
meet the requirements of this subclause
merely because the plan provides for a
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reasonable minimum guaranteed rate of
return or for a rate of return that is
equal to the greater of a fixed or variable
rate of return.
(II)

Preservation of capital

An interest credit (or an equivalent
amount) of less than zero shall in no
event result in the account balance or
similar amount being less than the aggregate amount of contributions credited
to the account.
(III)

Market rate of return

The Secretary of the Treasury may provide by regulation for rules governing
the calculation of a market rate of return
for purposes of subclause (I) and for
permissible methods of crediting interest
to the account (including fixed or variable interest rates) resulting in effective
rates of return meeting the requirements of subclause (I). In the case of a
governmental plan (as defined in the
first sentence of section 414(d) of Title
26, a rate of return or a method of crediting interest established pursuant to any
provision of Federal, State, or local law
(including any administrative rule or
policy adopted in accordance with any
such law) shall be treated as a market
rate of return for purposes of subclause
(I) and a permissible method of crediting
interest for purposes of meeting the requirements of subclause (I), except that
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this sentence shall only apply to a rate of
return or method of crediting interest if
such rate or method does not violate any
other requirement of this chapter.
(ii)

Special rule for plan conversions

If, after June 29, 2005, an applicable plan
amendment is adopted, the plan shall be
treated as failing to meet the requirements
of paragraph (l)(H) unless the requirements
of clause (iii) are met with respect to each
individual who was a participant in the plan
immediately before the adoption of the
amendment.
(iii)

Rate of benefit accrual

Subject to clause (iv), the requirements of
this clause are met with respect to any participant if the accrued benefit of the participant under the terms of the plan as in effect
after the amendment is not less than the
sum of(I) the participant's accrued benefit for
years of service before the effective date
of the amendment, determined under
the terms of the plan as in effect before
the amendment, plus
(II) the participant's accrued benefit
for years of service after the effective
date of the amendment, determined under the terms of the plan as in effect after the amendment.
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(iv) Special rules for early retirement subsidies
For purposes of clause (iii)(I), the plan shall
credit the accumulation account or similar
amount with the amount of any early retirement benefit or retirement-type subsidy
for the plan year in which the participant retires if, as of such time, the participant has
met the age, years of service, and other requirements under the plan for entitlement to
such benefit or subsidy.
(v)

Applicable plan amendment

For purposes of this subparagraph (I)

In general

The term "applicable plan amendment"
means an amendment to a defined benefit plan which has the effect of converting the plan to an applicable defined
benefit plan.
(II)
fits

Special rule for coordinated bene-

If the benefits of 2 or more defined benefit plans established or_ maintained by
an employer are coordinated in such a
manner as to have the effect of the adoption of an amendment described in subclause (I), the sponsor of the defined
benefit plan or plans providing for such
coordination shall be treated as having
adopted such a plan amendment as of
the date such coordination begins.
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(III) Multiple amendments
The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue
regulations to prevent the avoidance of
the purposes of this subparagraph through
the use of 2 or more plan amendments
rather than a single amendment.
(IV)

Applicable defined benefit plan

For purposes of this subparagraph, the
term "applicable defined benefit plan"
has the meaning given such term by section 1053(f)(3) of this title.
(vi) Termination requirements
An applicable defined benefit plan shall not
be treated as meeting the requirements of
clause (i) unless the plan provides that, upon
the termination of the plan -

if the interest credit rate (or an
equivalent amount) under the plan is a
variable rate, the rate of interest used to
determine accrued benefits under the
plan shall be equal to the average of the
rates of interest used under the plan
during the 5-year period ending on the
termination date, and
(I)

(II) the interest rate and mortality table used to determine the amount of any
benefit under the plan payable in the
form of an annuity payable at normal retirement age shall be the rate and table
specified under the plan for such purpose as of the termination date, except
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that if such interest rate is a variable
rate, the interest rate shall be determined under the rules of subclause (I).
(C)

Certain offsets permitted

A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the
requirements of paragraph ( 1) solely because the
plan provides offsets against benefits under the
plan to the extent such offsets are allowable
in applying the requirements of section 401(a) of
Title 26.
(D) Permitted disparities in plan contributions
or benefits
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the
requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the
plan provides a disparity in contributions or benefits with respect to which the requirements of
section 401(1) of Title 26 are met.
(E)

Indexing permitted
(i)

In general

A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet
the requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the plan provides for indexing of accrued benefits under the plan.
(ii) Protection against loss
Except in the case of any benefit provided in
the form of a variable annuity, clause (i) shall
not apply with respect to any indexing which
results in an accrued benefit less than the
accrued benefit determined without regard to
such indexing.

107a
(iii)

Indexing

For purposes of this subparagraph, the term
"indexing'' means, in connection with an accrued benefit, the periodic adjustment of the
accrued benefit by means of the application
of a recognized investment index or methodology.
(F) Early retirement benefit or retirement-type
subsidy
For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "early
retirement benefit" and "retirement-type subsidy" have the meaning given such terms in section
1053(g)(2)(A) ofthis title.
(G)

Benefit accrued to date

For purposes of this paragraph, any reference to
the accrued benefit shall be a reference to such
benefit accrued to date.
(j) Employment as firefighter or law enforcement
officer
It shall not be unlawful for an employer which is a
State, a political subdivision of a State, an agency or
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of
a State, or an interstate agency to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual because of such
individual's age if such action is taken -

(1) with respect to the employment of an individual as a firefighter or as a law enforcement
officer, the employer has complied with section 3(d)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1996 if the individual
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was discharged after the date described in such
section, and the individual has attained(A) the age of hiring or retirement, respectively, in effect under applicable State or local law on March 3, 1983; or
(B)(i) if the individual was not hired, the
age of hiring in effect on the date of such
failure or refusal to hire under applicable
State or local law enacted after September
30, 1996;or

if applicable State or local law was enacted after September 30, 1996, and the individual was discharged, the higher of(ii)

(I) the age of retirement in effect on
the date of such discharge under such
law; and
(II)

age 55; and

(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement
plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter.
(k) Seniority system or employee benefit plan; compliance
A seniority system or employee benefit plan shall
comply with this chapter regardless of the date of
adoption of such system or plan.
Lawful practices; minimum age as condition of
eligibility for retirement benefits; deductions from
severance pay; reduction of long-term disability benefits
(l)
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Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (f)(2)(B)
of this section It shall not be a violation of subsection
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because(l)(A)

(i) an employee pension benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(2) of this title) provides
for the attainment of a minimum age as a
condition of eligibility for normal or early retirement benefits; or
(ii) a defined benefit plan (as defined in
section 1002(35) of this title) provides for-

payments that constitute the subsidized portion of an early retirement benefit; or
(I)

(II) social security supplements for
plan participants that commence before
the age and terminate at the age (specified by the plan) when participants are
eligible to receive reduced or unreduced
old-age insurance benefits under title II
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401
et seq.), and that do not exceed such oldage insurance benefits.
(B) A voluntary early retirement incentive plan
that-

(i)

is maintained by (I) a local educational agency (as defined in section 7801 ofTitle 20, or

(II) an education association which
principally represents employees of 1
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or more agencies described in subclause
(I) and which is described in section
501(c)(5) or (6) of Title 26 and exempt
from taxation under section 501(a) of
Title 26, and
makes payments or supplements described in subclauses (I) and (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii) in coordination with a defined
benefit plan (as so defined) maintained by
an eligible employer described in section
457(e)(l)(A) of Title 26 or by an education association described in clause (i)(II),
(ii)

shall be treated solely for purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii) as if it were a part of the
defined benefit plan with respect to such
payments or supplements. Payments or supplements under such a voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall not constitute
severance pay for purposes of paragraph (2).
(2)(A) It shall not be a violation of subsection
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because following a contingent event unrelated to age(i) the value of any retiree health benefits
received by an individual eligible for an immediate pension;

the value of any additional pension
benefits that are made available solely as a
result of the contingent event unrelated to
age and following which the individual is eligible for not less than an immediate and unreduced pension; or
(ii)
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(iii) the values described in both clauses (i)
and (ii);

are deducted from severance pay made available as a result of the contingent event unrelated to age.
For an individual who receives immediate
pension benefits that are actuarially reduced under subparagraph (A)(i), the amount of the deduction available pursuant to subparagraph
(A)(i) shall be reduced by the same percentage as
the reduction in the pension benefits.
(B)

(C) For purposes of this paragraph, severance
pay shall include that portion of supplemental
unemployment compensation benefits (as described in section 501(c)(17) of Title 26) thatconstitutes additional benefits of up to
52 weeks;
(i)

(ii) has the primary purpose and effect of
continuing benefits until an individual becomes eligible for an immediate and unreduced pension; and

is discontinued once the individual becomes eligible for an immediate and unreduced pension.
(iii)

For purposes of this paragraph and solely
in order to make the deduction authorized under
this paragraph, the term "retiree health benefits"
means benefits provided pursuant to a group
health plan covering retirees, for which (determined as of the contingent event unrelated to
age)(D)
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the package of benefits provided by the
employer for the retirees who are below age
65 is at least comparable to benefits provided
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.);
(i)

the package of benefits provided by the
employer for the retirees who are age 65 and
above is at least comparable to that offered
under a plan that provides a benefit package
with one-fourth the value of benefits provided under title XVIII of such Act; or
(ii)

(iii) the package of benefits provided by the
employer is as described in clauses (i) and
(ii).

(E)(i) If the obligation of the employer to provide retiree health benefits is of limited duration,
the value for each individual shall be calculated
at a rate of $3,000 per year for benefit years before age 65, and $750 per year for benefit years
beginning at age 65 and above.
(ii) If the obligation of the employer to provide retiree health benefits is of unlimited
duration, the value for each individual shall
be calculated at a rate of $48,000 for individuals below age 65, and $24,000 for individuals age 65 and above.

The values described in clauses (i) and
(ii) shall be calculated based on the age of
the individual as of the date of the contingent event unrelated to age. The values are
effective on October 16, 1990, and shall be
adjusted on an annual basis, with respect to

-(iii)
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a contingent event that occurs subsequent to
the first year after October 16, 1990, based
on the medical component of the Consumer
Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.
(iv) If an individual is required to pay
a premium for retiree health benefits, the
value calculated pursuant to this subparagraph shall be reduced by whatever percentage of the overall premium the individual is
required to pay.
(F) If an employer that has implemented a deduction pursuant to subparagraph (A) fails to fulfill the obligation described in subparagraph (E),
any aggrieved individual may bring an action for
specific performance of the obligation described
in subparagraph (E). The relief shall be in addition to any other remedies provided under Federal or State law.
(3) It shall not be a violation of subsection (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because an
employer provides a bona fide employee benefit
plan or plans under which long-term disability
benefits received by an individual are reduced by
any pension benefits (other than those attributable to employee contributions)(A) paid to the individual that the individual voluntarily elects to receive; or

(B) for which an individual who has attained the later of age 62 or normal retirement age is eligible.
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(m)

Voluntary retirement incentive plans

Notwithstanding subsection (f)(2)(b) of this section, it
shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e)
of this section solely because a plan of an institution
of higher education (as defined in section 1001 of Title
20) offers employees who are serving under a contract
of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) supplemental benefits upon
voluntary retirement that are reduced or eliminated
on the basis of age, if(1) such institution does not implement with
respect to such employees any age-based reduction or cessation of benefits that are not such
supplemental benefits, except as permitted by
other provisions of this chapter;

(2) such supplemental benefits are in addition
to any retirement or severance benefits which
have been offered generally to employees serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure),
independent of any early retirement or exitincentive plan, within the preceding 365 days;
and
(3) any employee who attains the minimum age
and satisfies all non-age-based conditions for receiving a benefit under the plan has an opportunity lasting not less than 180 days to elect to
retire and to receive the maximum benefit that
could then be elected by a younger but otherwise
similarly situated employee, and the plan does
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not require retirement to occur sooner than 180
days after such election.

29 U.S.C.A. § 626. Recordkeeping,
investigation, and enforcement
(a) Attendance of witnesses; investigations, inspections, records, and homework regulations
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
shall have the power to make investigations and require the keeping of records necessary or appropriate
for the administration of this chapter in accordance
with the powers and procedures provided in sections
209 and 211 of this title.
(b) Enforcement; prohibition of age discrimination
under fair labor standards; unpaid minimum wages
and unpaid overtime compensation; liquidated damages; judicial relief; conciliation, conference, and persuasiOn
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in ac..:
cordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection
(a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of
this section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of
this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act under
section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a person as
a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of
this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be
payable only in cases of willful violations of this
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chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter
the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
Before instituting any action under this section, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall
attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or
practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance
with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
(c) Civil actions; persons aggrieved; jurisdiction; judicial relief; termination of individual action upon
commencement of action by Commission; jury trial
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action
in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal
or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of
this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person
to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such
employee under this chapter.
(1)

(2) In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of
fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing
as a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of
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whether equitable relief is sought by any party in
such action.
(d)(l) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge
alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Such a charge shall be filed -

(A) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
practice occurred; or
(B) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title
applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of
proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
(2) Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission
shall promptly notify all persons named in such
charge as prospective defendants in the action and
shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful
practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this chapter, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted,
when a person becomes subject to a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, or when a
person ·is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including
each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
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paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
(e) Reliance on administrative rulings; notice of
dismissal or termination; civil action after receipt of
notice
Section 259 of this title shall apply to actions under
this chapter. If a charge filed with the Commission
under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings
of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the
Commission, the Commission shall notify the person
aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this
section by a person defined in section 630(a) of this
title against the respondent named in the charge
within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such
notice.
(f)

Waiver

An individual may not waive any right or claim
under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and
voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a
waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary
unless at a minimum (1)

(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between
the individual and the employer that is written
in a manner calculated to be understood by such
individual, or by the average individual eligible
to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or
claims arising under this chapter;
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(C) the individual does not waive rights or
claims that may arise after the date the waiver is
executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only
in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is
entitled;

the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the
agreement;
(E)

the individual is given a period of at least
21 days within which to consider the agreement;
or
(F)(i)

if a waiver is requested in connection with
an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at
least 45 days within which to consider the.
agreement;
(ii)

(G) the agreement provides that for a period of
at least 7 days following the execution of such
agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has
expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with
an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer (at the commencement of
the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs
the individual in writing in a manner calculated
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to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to any class, unit, or group of individuals
covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits
applicable to such program; and
(i)

(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals
eligible or selected for the program, and the
ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not
eligible or selected for the program.

A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or an
action filed in court by the individual or the individual's representative, alleging age discrimination of a
kind prohibited under section 623 or 633a of this title
may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless
at a minimum (2)

(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period
of time within which to consider the settlement
agreement.

In any dispute that may arise over whether any
of the requirements, conditions, and circumstances
set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F),
(G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or
(B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of
proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a
(3)
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waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commission's rights and responsibilities to enforce this chapter. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with
the protected right of an employee to file a charge
or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission.

29 U.S.C. § 631. Age limits
(a)

Individuals at least 40 years of age

The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.
(b) Employees or applicants for employment in Federal Government
In the case of any personnel action affecting employees or applicants for employment which is subject to
the provisions of section 633a of this title, the prohibitions established in section 633a of this title shall
be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of
age.
(c)

Bona fide executives or high policymakers

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who
has attained 65 years of age and who, for the 2-year
period immediately before retirement, is employed
in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate
(I)
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nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the
employer of such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000.
(2) In applying the retirement benefit test of paragraph (1) of this subsection, if any such retirement benefit is in a form other than a straight life
annuity (with no ancillary benefits), or if employees
contribute to any such plan or make rollover contributions, such benefit shall be adjusted in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, after consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury, so that the benefit
is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no
ancillary benefits) under a plan to which employees
do not contribute and under which no rollover contributions are made.
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U.S. Constitution
AMENDMENT XN

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

